Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Pinhas 5763

Hemdat Yamim Pinchas - 19 Tammuz 5763 ******************************* This week's Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to the memory of Mina Presser on the occasion of her first yahrzeit. Her life exemplified growth through learning ************************************************************************************************* Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbis to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship combined with community service, ensures that its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations resulting in an exceptionally strong connection to Jewish communities worldwide. ******************************************************************************************************************** Who Was Tzlufchad? Harav Yosef Carmel Many people are known as their father's son or daughter. There may be no more classic case of a man who was his daughters' father than Tzlufchad, whose daughters showed their love for Eretz Yisrael when asking to receive their father's portion in the land. But who was he? All we are told is that he had no sons and died in the desert because of his own sin, not that of Korach (Bamidbar 27:3). There is a disagreement among the Tanaim (Shabbat 96b) if it is even permitted to reveal what his sin was. R. Akiva learns, based on the convergence of similar words, that he was the person who was caught violating Shabbat (Bamidbar 15). R. Yehuda ben Beteira reacted sharply, telling R. Akiva that under all circumstances, R. Akiva had acted improperly in advancing his theory. If he was the Shabbat violator, then why should R. Akiva reveal that which the Torah decided to keep hidden? If he was not as R. Akiva claimed, then why should R. Akiva cast aspersions on an honorable man? Several commentators (Ibn Ezra, Ramban, R. Yehuda Halevi) explain, with different nuances, that Tzlufchad did not sin any known, specific sin, but in general was not found Divinely worthy to enter Eretz Yisrael. Rashi ignores the aforementioned opinions and brings the opinion (apparently, R. Shimon) that Tzlufchad was one of the ma'apilim (those who attempted to enter Eretz Yisrael prematurely). The Sifrei Zuta (15) objects to those opinions that would date Tzlufchad's death in the beginning of the 40-year period in the desert. After all, that would mean that the youngest of his daughters would be 40. Yet, we are told that not one of these very worthy, eligible women was married at the time they received permission to inherit their father (see Bamidbar 30). (See our d'var Torah from Parashat Shelach, where we raised the possibility that the story of the ma'apilim was indeed at the end of the 40 years). We will end off, uncharacteristically, by paraphrasing the Zohar's opinion on the matter. The Zohar picks up on the fact that Tzlufchad's daughters did not go directly to Moshe alone, but presented the matter to a forum of people. It posits that Tzlufchad was a leader within the tribe of Yosef, who did not receive an appointment by Moshe and came out against Moshe. The daughters feared that Moshe would hold the matter against them, unaware that, as the Torah said, Moshe was the most humble person on the face of the earth. Moshe, to avoid any questions about a possible conflict of interests, removed himself from the legal proceedings and presented the matter to Hashem to decide. From the Zohar, we merited seeing not only another possible identification of Tzlufchad, but we also learned another lesson in the proper behavior of a leader. One not only shouldn't take revenge against "political opponents," but shouldn't even take offense when someone assumes that he is likely to do so. *************************************************************************************************************************** P'ninat Mishpat Appeal of Arbitration Agreement Regarding Child Custody (based on Piskei Din Rabbaniim XVIII, pp. 103-107) Case: A couple signed an arbitration agreement, as part of their divorce settlement, to settle any questions that will arise in reference to child custody through a certain group of competent arbiters. After the arbiters decided not to transfer custody of the child to the father at a certain age, as had been foreseen in the original agreement, the father appealed to beit din to adjudicate instead of the arbiters, saying that the arbiters should not have jurisdiction. Decision: When one accepts upon himself extraordinary rules of adjudication (such as allowing relatives to serve as dayanim), there are different opinions as to how this works. The Ra'avan sees the agreement as an obligation to pay or relinquish rights to money or property in accordance with the decisions reached in the unconventional manner. The Nimulei Yosef is of the opinion that one need not obligate oneself in money but must just confirm his willingness to be bound by the given legal process. However, in this case, there was no agreement to an unconventional judicial process. The panelists who were chosen are valid to adjudicate the matter. All that was needed was to determine which, of a variety of possible panels, would be the one to hear the case. In such a case, a lower level of agreement is necessary to finalize the matter, including writing down the dayanim's names (Choshen Mishpat 13:2) and perhaps even if they starting to hear the case (Rama, ad loc.). Once the arbiters began to hear the case, their jurisdiction applied to all related matters, even those that did not arise in the first meetings. Therefore, the father cannot question their authority well into the process. Minority decision: The agreement of the sides to a certain arbitration panel is binding only when the case is a monetary dispute between the two sides. However, a question of child custody depends on what is determined to be the child's best interest, objectively, and the parents are only legal guardians in this context. Therefore, either side can demand that the normal authorities now decide what the welfare of the child dictates, irrespective of previous decisions. Response of Majority Opinion: If there were reason to believe that the arbiters made a mistake, then beit din could overrule their decision. However, since they are not only a legitimate panel, but have more expertise and experience in the circumstances of this specific case than any beit din, there is no reason to take the matter out of their hands. *************************************************************************************************************************** Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l) The Unity of the Nation (from Harabanut V'hamedinah, pg. 217) If we want to encapsulate the fundamental philosophy of the Mizrachi movement, I think one can express it in a word- shleimut (completeness and unity): the shleimut of Judaism. This is a concept that, with the conditions that prevailed in the Diaspora, deteriorated and shrank. The first and foremost shleimut, which the Mizrachi stressed, is the shleimut of the nation. This is not a new concept, but it is one that needed to be renewed in its focus. This fundamental idea is found in Tanach and in Chazal and was explained and deepened by the Maharal. He wrote of the special content and special qualities of the Jewish people as the Chosen People. It was these qualities that actually preceded the giving of the Torah. For more than we are special because we were given the Torah, we were given the Torah because we are special. These qualities came to us as an inheritance from Avraham, Yitzchak, and Ya'akov. These qualities find expression in the three signs of a Jew, which Chazal identified: merciful, bashful, and doers of acts of kindness. Jews also possess a unique sensitivity for that which is beyond this world - believers the sons of believers. Because this uniqueness is not external but stems from the depths of the soul, we must demand that the shleimut of the nation find expression in all practical elements. We do not want our nation to be broken up into a myriad of factions. Even if the reason behind the separation is noble, it must be remembered that the very existence of factionalism contains grave dangers. That is what Chazal said about the situation of "ha'emet ne'ederet," that the truth will be like separate herds, because different factions will cause the disappearance of the inner content that unites the entire Jewish people. We try to impart the idea of the spiritual power of the Jewish soul also to those who are far from practical fulfillment of a Torah lifestyle. We believe that by awakening the spiritual spark which even "distant" Jews possess, they too will understand that a true, full, national life is possible only when we try to run our personal and collective lives based on the precepts of the Torah. Therefore, we are interested that public affairs be undertaken with as much cooperation with as broad a segment of society as is possible. This was an idea that had to be renewed, because it had been lost. In the last period of Jewish life in the Diaspora, we suffered from the inability of different segments of the Jewish community to work together. The situation arose under extreme circumstances, as movements arose to purposely try to break off from the historic legacy of Judaism. They sought assimilation and changes in the religion to the extent that it engendered a denial of the Divine origin of the Torah and trust in the words of the Rabbis. This caused elements of the true-to-Torah camp to break off from what had once been unified, community frameworks. With a feeling that there was no hope that we could work together with those who had strayed, separation seemed like the only way to enable Jewish values to survive. However, "giving up" on other Jews hastened the rate of assimilation of those who strayed, sometimes leaving them without survivors. Although there are great difficulties and even short-term dangers in the attempt to work together, this is what is necessary to prevent us from turning into two nations, with limbs falling off from the body of the nation. We have to organize ourselves for a stubborn battle, with a belief that the "eternity of Israel will not deceive" and the healthy outlook will prevail and help elements of our nation to return to the unity and shleimut which is the essence of our nation. *************************************************************************************************************************** Ask the Rabbi Question: Is tevilat keilim (immersing in a mikveh of a utensil that was bought from non-Jews) necessary for all utensils that come in direct contact with food? Answer: We cannot, of course, go into all of the factors that cause that something be required to have tevilat keilim, but we will give some guidelines, especially on the point of direct contact, which you refer to. First, we should point out that only keilim (utensils) made of metal or glass need tevila (immersion). An additional point, which is important but beyond our present scope, is that disposable items, even if they temporarily have the same function as classical utensils, are not categorized as keilim and do not require tevila. The mitzva of tevilat keilim is found in the Torah in the context of doing hechsher keilim, removing through heat any taste of any non-kosher food that might be found in the walls of utensils (see Bamidbar 31:21-24). Rabba bar Avuha stated that tevilat keilim applies even to new pots (Avoda Zara 75b), meaning that the immersion is necessary irrespective of whether anything non-kosher is in the walls. Rav Sheshet asked that if that is the case, then perhaps utensils of all sorts should require tevila. The answer given is that the Torah was referring only to klei seuda (literally, utensils of a meal). But what is considered a kli seuda? Rashi (ad loc.) says that since the Torah describes utensils that were used with heat from a flame, it must be talking about utensils that are involved in a meal (apparently, including its preparation). The Pri Chadash (YD 120:1) asks that there are utensils that are used in connection with heat but are unrelated to food. Therefore, he prefers the Rashba's explanation, that these p'sukim are dealing with the type of utensil, which belong to the category of those things that may require kashering. If one takes a very narrow view of the Rashba, one can come to the conclusion that the kli (or perhaps even the part of the kli which is made of metal or glass) must come in actual, physical contact with the food. However, poskim understand that we are talking about the category of a utensil, namely, one which is used directly in connection with food, whether or not it comes in actual, physical contact. This understanding of klei seuda contains both elements of leniency and stringency. Does a can opener require tevila? On one hand, if one opens up a can of tuna fish, the can opener almost always touches the food. On the other hand, its job is not, by design, connected to the food but to the can. So presumably, the incidental contact with the food should not make it obligated in tevila. Indeed, the standard p'sak is that it does not require tevila (see Tevilat Keilim (Cohen) 11: 171 and footnote, ad loc.). If, on the flip side, one covers a baking pan with waxed paper, the food is still considered to be baking in the pan, despite the fact that it touches only the paper, and the pan requires tevila (Rav Sh. Z. Orbach, quoted in Tevilat Keilim, 1: (7)). This is not to say that direct contact between the food and the utensil is not important, but just that it depends on the nature and extent of the direct contact. For example, if a pot made of a substance that does not require tevila is coated in a significant way (not just for beautification) by a substance that does require tevila, then position of the coating could make a difference. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 120:1) implies that only when the obligated substance is on the inside do we require tevila (the Rama may argue, see commentators). Also, if the utensil in question is separated from the food by another kli, then one does not need tevila. Thus, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 120:4) says that a tri-pod that holds a pot over the flame is exempt from tevila, and the same is true for the modern devices for suspending pots. 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