Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Acharei mot Kdoshim 5764

Hemdat Yamim Parshat Acharei Mot- Kedoshim 10 Iyar 5764 ***************************************************************************** This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to the memory of R' Meir ben Yechezkel Shraga Brachfeld o.b.m., Yitzchak Eliezer Ben Avraham Mordechai Jacobson o.b.m, *************************************************************************************************************************** Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbis to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship combined with community service, ensures that its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations resulting in an exceptionally strong connection to Jewish communities worldwide. *************************************************************************************************************************** Let Your Animal Bring You Up, Not Down We saw last week that a drop in one's spiritual level causes a spiritual danger even in regard to one who remains on a high level. This week's Torah reading teaches us a lesson that goes a step further. The Torah (Vayikra 17: 3-7) says that one who slaughters the type of animal which can be brought as a korban (sacrifice) not in that context is subject to the severe, Divine punishment of karet (being "cut off" spiritually). Throughout most of Jewish history, this prohibition applied only to mukdashim, animals which were designated for a korban. One can understand the severity of taking something that was already set aside for Divine service and "stealing it" away from Him. But according to Rabbi Yishmael (Chulin 16b; see Ramban on our p'sukim) the prohibition once applied even to regular animals. When the Mishkan was in the desert and Bnei Yisraelhad the easy opportunity to bring korbanot shelamim (the owner, altar, and kohanim split up the annimals into sections for each), they could not slaughter animals for personal consumption alone. The apparent lesson of the prohibition, according to R. Yishmael, is that when one readily has the opportunity to do something in a manner of holiness but he opts to do it in a mundane manner, he may commit a serious sin. (Of course, not in all cases does the Torah legislate a binding prohibition.) Rabbi Akiva (ibid.), on the other hand, said that even in the desert, where Bnei Yisrael lived in the altar's proximity, it was permitted to eat besar ta'ava (meat eaten for pleasure). One could then claim that according to him, the opportunity to bring a korban does not create restrictions on how and where to slaughter the animal, unless the animal was designated for a korban. However, the Netziv (ibid.:3) claims that even according to R. Akiva, it was forbidden to slaughter even a regular animal out of the context of a korban, because such slaughter was often associated with idol worship. Rather it was permitted only to kill the animal through the process of nechira, which was not related to idol worship. We can now understand the severe punishment for the violator, as his action is tainted by suspicions of idol worship. Let us consider who this person is whom, according to the Netziv's understanding of R. Akiva, the Torah encourages to bring a korban. It is someone who, if not required to bring a korban, may bring the animal for avoda zara. Who wants a korban brought under such circumstances? If we return to our original theme, the matter is understood. The Torah refers to a normal Jew who has the potential to do the right thing, to bring his animal as a korban at the Mishkan, before eating its meat. If he does not take advantage of his opportunity, his neutral actions could, sooner or later or progressively, turn into very negative ones. It is hard to stay pareve. One who can go up spiritually but chooses not to, exposes himself to great, spiritual dangers. ************************************************************************************************************************** P'ninat Mishpat – Ability to Appeal a Ruling of Compromise (based on Piskei Din Rabbaniim- vol. XVII, pp. 158-162) Case: The regional court ruled on the demand for compensation of an employee who was fired. In a ruling they characterized as a p'shara (compromise), the beit din required payment for some of the demands but not on others. The employer appealed certain elements of the ruling to the Supreme Rabbinical Court. The employee responded that it is not possible to appeal a matter that was decided by arbitration. Ruling: In general, appeal is clearly possible on matters adjudicated by regional batei din to whom the two sides submitted for arbitration. This is explicit in the rules and regulations of the Rabbinical Court system, and one who submits to their jurisdiction accepts those rules, unless an explicit exception is made in the arbitration agreement. In this case, the sides agreed that beit din could rule, whether according to din (strict law) or p'shara. However, in this case, there is no room for appeal. This conclusion was arrived at by two of the dayanim in slightly different ways. It is first important to understand that there are two different types of p'sharot. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 12:5) describes the first as follows. "A dayan has the authority to make a judgment like a compromise in a case where the matter cannot be clarified and he cannot allow the matter leave his hands in an unfinished manner." The S'ma (ibid.:12) says that such a judicial step can be taken against the will of the litigants. The second type of p'shara refers to a case where the sides agree in advance that the system used for deciding the matter will not be limited to the letter of the law, even where it is possible to determine what the din is. Regarding this second type of p'shara, the litigant's formal agreement is necessary. One dayan saw the ruling that the original beit din categorized as a p'shara, as the first kind of p'shara. He reasoned that since the matter could not be determined clearly, it was supposed to be decided based on the dayan's instincts. Such a vague ruling cannot be questioned, because it does not lend itself to an absolute label of correct or mistaken. Another dayan viewed the ruling as an example of the second type of p'shara, where the dayanim do not need to seek the set din. In such a case, the basis of their decision certainly cannot be questioned [ed. note- unless there is suspicion of corruption]. Although such a p'shara requires the litigants' agreement, in this case the arbitration agreement they signed included a provision of "whether for din or for p'shara." The p'shara the sides agreed to includes the second type, as the first type of p'shara does not require their agreement. *************************************************************************************************************************** Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l) The Proper Reaction to Israeli Independence - Part I (from Zeh Hayom Asa Hashem, pp. 8-9) "Reishit tz'michat geulatenu- the beginning of the blossoming of our redemption." This is the phrase coined by the rabbis and wise men of Yerushalayim, headed by Harav Tzvi Pesach Frank z.t.l. to describe our historical period. This was done in a proclamation they publicized on 15 Shevat 5709 (Jan. '49), within the first year of the establishment of the State. During those great days, the whole community was under the influence of the revelation of a Divine act of good will, expressed by the broad spectrum of the community by that phrase. Even those of our fellow believers in Hashem who, for many years, stood by their opposition to the Zionist Movement with "proofs" that the liberation of our people would not come in such a manner (as if they can dictate to the Holy One Blessed Be He the way He will bring close the geula) recognized the significance of the great period our nation merited to be in. In those days, everyone saw the period against the backdrop of that which preceded it, the terrible holocaust that befell the House of Israel, which cut off the lives of 6 million of our brethren in strange, yet calculated deaths. Smoking embers remained where once had stood communities with long, rich legacies. Refugees lacking the barest necessities wandered without a place to rest their tired feet, while the British Mandate securely locked the gates to the Land of their Forefathers. And then suddenly a rescue raft was discovered in the form of an independent state, which, despite being born in the midst of fire and blood, arose and announced before the whole world, "the Nation of Israel is alive and will live forever." The coasts of the Land would remain wide open for all who belong to the Nation of Israel, and it would serve as a haven for an oppressed nation. At that time the national flag waved proudly over the whole House of Israel, and the Torah community upon all of its shades did not find it necessary to voice their reservations. It is true that since those days, many things have happened that have caused great disappointment for the community of those who keep Torah and mitzvot. Certainly this is not what we expected. We did not think that the judicial system would arise as a continuation of that of the British Mandate. In our naivet?, we thought that the Jewish legal system, which is strongly established upon the Torah's pillars of morality and logic, expounded upon over centuries by brilliant men, would be the lone basis for the State's judiciary. We did not imagine that that which is known as the "general" school system would educate Israel's children without knowledge of the Torah of Israel. The Book of Books, which is the source for the whole world's culture, sits in a lonely corner, with school children knowing just individual sections, taught to them as some type of fairy tale. We did not think that Shabbat would be chased away from our streets or that civil marriages would be considered as a replacement for marriage k'dat Moshe v'Yisrael. It did not occur to us that there would be among us murderers, rapists, and drug addicts. We could go on, but that's not the point. All of the above woes were not decreed from Heaven. Chazal have taught us, "All is in the Hands of Heaven except for fear of Hashem." All of us, individually and collectively, have the ability to make a difference. Those who are loyal to Hashem but sit concealed in their homes in the Diaspora, which they are dedicated to glorify, closing their ears to the calls of the Land of their Forefathers, have the obligation to come and help rectify the problems. ************************************************************************************************************************** Ask the Rabbi Question: I have heard that it is preferable to make Kiddush on wine rather than grape juice. Is that true, and if so, does that mean that grape juice is not valid for Kiddush? Answer: The gemara (Bava Batra 97a-b) has a rule that any type of wine which is valid b'dieved (post facto) for nesachim (libations on the altar) is valid l'chatchila (as a matter of choice) for Kiddush. One of the examples given is yayin migito ("wine" which has just been pressed), which has not had the opportunity to ferment. This is also the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 272:2. This is what we commonly call grape juice, and, therefore, it appears clear that grape juice that has no alcoholic content is totally fit for Kiddush. That is basically the bottom line, but there are a few reservations that justify the claim you heard that wine is preferable. The Magen Avraham (ad loc.:3) points out that even though one may choose grape juice for Kiddush, it is more proper to use "older wine," which is at least 40 days old (Mishna Berura ad loc.:5, citing the Magen Avraham). (Be aware that before the advent of preservatives, refrigeration and vacuum packing, grape juice could not last that long without fermentation.) The implication of the Magen Avraham is not that there is no need for alcoholic content, but that wine that has sat at least moderately is considered to be of higher quality, and the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:3) says that it is proper to choose good wine for Kiddush. Thus, high quality grape juice could be preferable to low quality wine, and the matter might depend on personal preference (see Moadim U'zmanim VII, 181 in a related context). There is some room to claim that our grape juice is halachically inferior to that which the classical sources refer to as yayin migito. In the process of making grape juice, something is done to the juice (usually including heating it to a level that is considered cooking) to prevent the natural process of fermentation from taking place over time. This raises two issues. Firstly, there are several important classical opinions that cooked wine (mevushal) is unfit for use for Kiddush (see opinions in the Tur, OC 272). However, on this issue, which may also apply to pasteurized wines, the ruling is to be lenient (Shulchan Aruch and Rama ibid.:8). Another claim is that the Rashbam on Bava Batra (97b) implies that yayin migito is valid even though it isn't alcoholic, because it will become so if left alone. This is not the case with our grape juice, which cannot turn into wine. However, there are several ways to deal with that claim. One is that since the grape juice is considered wine fit for Kiddush before pasteurization, it does not lose that status later on, since the process is not a destructive one for the juice (Minchat Shlomo I,4). Most poskim rule leniently on all of these issues and say that our standard types of grape juice receive the beracha of "Borei pri hagafen" and are fit for Kiddush (see Yechave Da'at II,35; Shevet Halevi IX,58; V'zot Haberacha, pg. 239). What remains a problem is grape juice which is reconstituted in the process of its production. In such a case, most of its water is removed, and new water is added to it later on. Rav S.Z. Orbach (Minchat Shlomo, ibid.) felt that in such a case, the minority of concentrated grape juice cannot turn the majority of external water into grape juice. While we have heard that this type of grape juice is uncommon in Israel, we cannot speak for other parts of the world. (Most "organized" countries probably require producers to inform the public that the grape juice has undergone this process.) Since wine and grape juice require rabbinical supervision for reasons of kashrut, it is appropriate that many of the hasgachot have begun writing whether they are fit for Kiddush and get a beracha of "Hagafen." This is important primarily to ensure that the wine is not overly diluted, which is a halachic concern, especially for Sephardim. In short, grape juice is fine for Kiddush. Unless one has personal preferences (taste, health, or educational) wine is more festive and preferable, especially at night, when we are more strict. Harav Shaul Israeli zt"l Founder and President Deans: Harav Yosef Carmel Harav Moshe Ehrenreich ERETZ HEMDAH 5 Ha-Mem Gimmel St. P.O.B 36236 Jerusalem 91360 Tel/Fax: 972-2-5371485 Email: eretzhem@netvision.net.il web-site: www.eretzhemdah.org American Friends of Eretz Hemdah Institutions c/o Olympian 8 South Michigan Ave. Suite 605 Chicago, IL 60603 USA Our Taxpayer ID#: 36-4265359

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