Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Behalotcha 5763

There will be a difference in the reading of the parshiot between Eretz Yisrael and Chutz La’aretz in the coming weeks. We, as being located in Israel, will be sending all of our subscribers according to the parsha being read here. Therefore, if you live in Chutz L’aretz, you may want to save your weekly mailing of Hemdat Yamim for the following week. We will be having our annual Yom Iyun, on the 8th Yahrtzeit of Marav Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli, z.t.l.. It will take place on Thursday, 19 Sivan (June 19) from 1:30 – 6:45 in our Beit Midrash (5 Hamem Gimel St., Jerusalem). The topic will be, “The Reemergence of Study of Tanach in Our Days.” A very distinguished set of lecturers has been chosen for this important event. The general public is warmly invited. (There are seating accommodations for women). For more information contact us: info@eretzhemdah.org phone: (02) 537-1485 fax: (02) 537-9626 ======================================================== Hemdat Yamim Parshat B'ha'alotcha 14 Sivan 5763 *********************************************** This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to Sarah Chava Noble on the occasion of her Bat Mitzva. We wish her continued success in all of her endeavors. *********************************************************************** Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbis to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship combined with community service, ensures that its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations resulting in an exceptionally strong connection to Jewish communities worldwide. **************************************************************************************************** The Light of the Oral Law Harav Moshe Ehrenreich Ohel Moed (The Tent of Meeting) was the place where Moshe received critical messages from Hashem on behalf of His nation, Israel. One is curious what the first such message was. According to the Midrash (Bamidbar Rabba 15:8) it was the commandment to Aharon to kindle the lights of the menorah. Rashi says that the background of the message was that Hashem wanted to assure Aharon, who was disturbed by the fact that he had not taken part in the n'si'im's (tribal heads) offerings. Hashem told him that his part, lighting and fixing the lights, was greater than theirs. It seems strange that this first message seems connected to human frailty instead of some eternal concept. The Ramban asks why Aharon's role in regard to the menorah was more stressed than regarding the sacrifices and incense. He suggests that it alludes to the historical role of Aharon's descendents, the Hasmoneans. They restored the menorah's use in their days and initiated the Chanukah lights, which continue shining even in the period when sacrifices have ceased. The question still begs why this historical idea was chosen as Hashem's first message. R. Tzadok of Lublin (Pri Tzadik, B'ha'alotcha 3) posits that Aharon's kindling of the menorah hints to the power of the Oral Law, the light that shines through human intervention. It is the kohen's role to disseminate the Oral Law, as the pasuk says, "For the lips of the kohen shall guard knowledge, and Torah shall they seek from his mouth" (Malachi 2:7). The message is prefaced by "daber el Aharon v'amarta." Daber (speak) represents the power and vitality of the Written Law and amarta (saying) represents softer words ("my saying shall drip like dew," Devarim 32:2). Moshe instilled in Aharon the power to kindle not only the literal, but also the figurative, light of the Torah. This power continued on spiritually even when the menorah's use ceased and found expression in birkat kohanim (priestly blessing). "Hashem should bless you" - with an increase in the Oral Law with which every person is blessed, according to his level. "Hashem shall give you light" - for a mitzva is a candle and Torah is light. "Hashem shall give you peace" - this peace is also connected to Torah, about which it is said, "Hashem will give strength to His nation; Hashem will bless His nation with peace." We find many Talmudic passages on how study of the Oral Law, while built on argument, should always bring love between the "combatants" (see Yevamot 14b, Kiddushin 30b). Ibn Ezra explains that the connection between the ideas of the p'sukim teaches us that Hashem's speech will be even at night (when the menorah was lit). But the Ramban proves that Hashem spoke to Moshe specifically in the day? We can justify Ibn Ezra's approach based on the midrash that Moshe would learn from Hashem in the day and review the learning in the Ohel Moed at night. That review, with all that came with it, epitomized the Oral Law, giving significance to Hashem's word through the night. The first message in Ohel Moed teaches the importance of toil in Torah study. That idea enabled the Hasmoneans to create a holiday (see S'fat Emet) and maintained generations of Jews, who were missing the menorah's light. ******************************************************************************************* P'ninat Mishpat - A Conditional Will (condensed from Piskei Din Rabbani'im XVII, pp. 355-359) Case: A request was made to certify a will which transferred money to inheritors both by means of an admission that certain property belongs to them and by means of the will's benefactor obligating himself in the elements of the will. The issue is that both the admission and the obligation were done on condition that the benefactor could back out until soon before his death. Is such a will valid? Ruling: Does an admission work if it is conditional? The gemara (Nedarim 27b) relates: "A man handed over his proofs (in the form of a document) to beit din and said, 'If I do not return within 30 days, my proofs shall be invalid'. He was unable to return within 30 days. Rav Huna said that his proofs were invalid." Tosafot (ad loc.) explains that the documents became invalid based on the admission that his proofs were false. Several other rishonim concur with this explanation, from which it emerges that one can admit something, even when it is tied to a condition which will be determined in the future. However, the Ran (ad loc.) says that only an unconditional admission can stand on its own. In order for the invalidation of his document to work conditionally, one requires a kinyan sudar. Further investigation shows that it depends what the condition limits. If there is admission of an obligation and the obligation is conditional, then it is valid even according to the Ran. Only if the obligation is complete but the admission is conditional is there a problem with the admission (based on Shut Ri Migash 97, 135). It is unclear which category the will in question belongs to. We normally rule that a document that can be interpreted in two ways is interpreted in the way that is less advantageous to the one who needs it to extract money (see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 42:9 and Shach ad loc.:20). The Maharit says that an obligation that the obligator can renege on is not valid, as appears to be in our case. However, the Chemdat Shlomo (EH 62) says that the ability to renege is a problem only if that ability is permanent. Then, there is, in effect, no obligation, as there is never a time that it can be acted on. However, if there is time before his death that the obligation is final, then the obligation is valid and takes effect at that time. The Rashba seems to totally reject the Maharit's limitation on conditional obligations, as long as the effect of the obligation is retroactive from the time of the performance of the obligation. One can't accept the will based on the concept of situmta (that accepted practices of agreement are binding) because this will was done without witnesses, and Israeli law required witnesses. Even though the law has subsequently been changed and a will can be accepted without witnesses, since at the time of the will's execution it was not the accepted practice, situmta is not applicable. ****************************************************************************************************** Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l) Exhuming a Grave- Part II (based on Amud Hay'mini, siman 35) [Last time, we began discussing whether it is appropriate to exhume a grave of a woman in order to transfer the remains from a plot of her family to a plot bought for her and her husband. We brought sources that one can exhume in order to bury next to closer relatives and saw sources indicating that a husband is the closest relative. The question remains if all sources agree that the full level of marital relationship continues after death]. Tosafot (Bava Batra 114b) brings two explanations for why a deceased husband does not "inherit his wife in the grave," which would have allowed his inheritors to receive the wife's estate through him even when he died before her. The Rivan says that it is because their relationship, which the Torah calls "sh'er" (implying great closeness), is severed by death. The second opinion tries to disprove this assertion from a reference in Yevamot 55b to a deceased wife as still being a married woman. The Maharsha (ad loc.) distinguishes between the case where the husband dies and one where the wife dies. The Rivan may have said that the relationship is severed only when the husband dies, but not when the wife dies. In the latter case, one would need a special pasuk that "inheritance in the grave" does not occur. What logic is there for the Maharsha's distinction? When a husband dies, his wife is permitted to remarry. In order for that to happen, she must no longer be considered married. However, when a wife dies, the fact that her husband can remarry is not, according to Torah-level law, a change in status. Therefore, we can continue to preserve the husband-wife relationship after she dies. According to our understanding of the Maharsha, another issue can be reconciled. The Yad Shaul says that when a woman dies during the life of her second husband, she should be buried next to him. The Even Ya'akov asks from the Zohar that after resurrection, a woman will be reunited with her first husband, not her second. We can now reconcile as follows. The Zohar is talking about a case where the second husband also died before the wife. Then, with both marriages similarly severed, the preference is to the first husband, as a first marriage is of higher significance. In summary, in our case, where the wife died first, burial next to the husband is certainly preferred to burial next to other relatives. We also see confirmation of the importance of a husband and wife being buried together from Ya'akov's stress that he buried Leah in his plot and his need to justify why he did not do so for Rachel. There is even room to say that when she was buried, it was as if there was a condition that she would be re-interred if she could not be by her husband. However, it does not seem that the exhuming should be done while the husband is still alive. What gain is there for her before he is buried next to her? (It is also better to make the transfer after the flesh has decomposed). The proper arrangement would, thus, be to leave instructions to exhume the wife's grave after the husband's burial. An even better solution all around is to bury both parties in Eretz Yisrael. Burial in the Diaspora does not bode well for having a secure grave, and there is great significance to burial in Israel. It is clear in the Shulchan Aruch that one can immediately re-inter the deceased from a cemetery in the Diaspora to one in Israel. *********************************************************************************************** Ask the Rabbi Question: Can a minor (katan) do mitzvot and make berachot to be motzi (on behalf of) an adult (gadol)? Answer: We will start with the explicit Talmudic sources on what a katan can and cannot do and then proceed to fill in the gaps in between. The mishna in Rosh Hashana (29a) says that one who is not obligated in a mitzva cannot fulfill the mitzva on behalf of one who is obligated. One example it gives is that a katan cannot blow shofar on behalf of adults. However, the gemara in Berachot (20a) states that a katan can recite Bircat Hamazone on behalf of a gadol if the gadol ate only enough to be obligated mid'rabbanan (rabbinically) in Bircat Hamazone. In such a case, he who is obligated mid'rabbanan (because of his age) can be motzi another who is obligated mid'rabbanan (because of the amount he ate) (ibid.). What happens if the child also ate a relatively small amount, so that his obligation is not mid'oraita (by Torah law) for two reasons (age, quantity) while the adult is missing only one element in order to be obligated mid'oraita? A similar question is whether a katan can fulfill a rabbinic mitzva on behalf of a gadol. The Ran (10a to Shabbat) cites the Ba'al Ha'itur that a katan who is old enough to be trained in mitzvot can light the Chanuka candles on behalf of a gadol. The apparent logic is that all who are obligated rabbinically are, for all intents and purposes, on the same level of obligation, no matter how many reasons there are for there not being a Torah obligation. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 675:3) brings two opinions on the matter but sides with the opinion that a minor cannot be motzi an adult (see ibid. 689:2). However, in the case of Birkat Hamazone, there is more reason to say that a katan can be motzi a gadol when both ate a small amount. One who already fulfilled his mitzva can still be motzi one who has not (Rosh Hashana 29a). This is because one does not have to be presently obligated in a mitzva in order to be motzi one who is now obligated. The fact that he is a person to whom the obligation is pertinent, combined with the responsibility to help one's fellow Jew fulfill his obligation, make him considered one who is commanded in the mitzva. There is logic to say that since the child can eat a satiating meal and be obligated in Birkat Hamazone on the level of a single d'rabbanan, that level of obligation applies to him, and he can be motzi an adult (Magen Avraham 689:4). Despite this idea, the Mishna Berura rules that one should avoid having a katan be motzi a gadol in Birkat Hamazone if they both ate the same amount (186:7). It is noteworthy that, regarding the proper procedure, there are differences between different berachot and mitzvot, and we will mention just a few. One cannot make a beracha on behalf of another in regard to food unless the one who is making the beracha is making it for himself at the same time (Shulchan Aruch, OC 167:19, regarding beracha rishona; ibid. 197:4 and Mishna Berura ad loc. regarding beracha acharona). It is proper for one to be yotzei with another only if they are joining together to start the meal (ibid. 167:11), they are making a zimun, or one does not know how to bentch himself (ibid. 193:1). Harav Shaul Israeli zt"l Founder and President Deans: Harav Yosef Carmel Harav Moshe Ehrenreich ERETZ HEMDAH 5 Ha-Mem Gimmel St. P.O.B 36236 Jerusalem 91360 Tel/Fax: 972-2-5371485 Email: eretzhem@netvision.net.il web-site: www.eretzhemdah.org American Friends of Eretz Hemdah Institutions c/o Olympian 8 South Michigan Ave. Suite 605 Chicago, IL 60603 USA Our Taxpayer ID#: 36-4265359

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