Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Chayei_sara 5764

Hemdat Yamim Parshat Chayei Sarah 27 Cheshvan 5764 ***************************************************************** This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to the memory of R' Meir ben Yechezkel Shraga Brachfeld o.b.m. , Yitzchak Eliezer Ben Avraham Mordechai Jacobson o.b.m and Yehudit bat Harav Shmuel Shlomo Carrey o.b.m ***************************************************************************************** Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbis to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship combined with community service, ensures that its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations resulting in an exceptionally strong connection to Jewish communities worldwide. *************************************************************************************************************************** Presents That Keep the Family Going Harav Yosef Carmel Toward the end of the parasha, we find Avraham's influence broadening as he implements his status as "the father of many nations" (Bereishit 17: 4-5). This is accomplished by marrying Ketura, who gave birth to six children, who were the fathers of nations (ibid. 25: 1-4). On the other hand, Avraham ensured that the blessing of "to your offspring I will give this land" (ibid. 15:18) would be fulfilled only with his offspring from Sarah. This he did by sending away his sons from the concubines to a foreign land during his lifetime, after giving them presents (matanot) (ibid. 25:6). The Torah implies that the marriages, birth of new nations, and their separation from Yitzchak ended well, as this section is followed by the following summary of the end of Avraham's life. "Avraham expired and died at a ripe old age, old and content, and he was gathered to his nation" (ibid.:7). This scenario reminds us of a different one in Tanach, but one which ended in a very different manner. Yehoshafat, King of Yehuda also gave presents (matanot) to his sons in order to appease them and ensure that his eldest son, Yehoram, would rule after him (Divrei Hayamim II, 21:3). The aftermath of that arrangement was a very bitter one. "Yehoram was established on his father's kingdom, he strengthened his position, and he killed all of his brothers" (ibid.: 4). Are there any signs that show us what went wrong in Yehoshafat's plan? The p'sukim go on to tell about Yehoram's background. "He went in the way of the Kings of Israel, as the House of Achav did, for he took the daughter of Achav as a wife... and he caused the inhabitants of Yerushalayim and Yehuda to sin" (ibid.: 6-11). The problem did not begin with Yehoram, as his forbears, Assa and Yehoshafat, the Kings of Yehuda, were involved in intermingling with the corrupt offspring of C'na'an, by marriage with princesses of Sidon. It is now clear what the difference is between the two cases. Avraham married Ketura and became the patriarch of more nations in order to promulgate the belief in monotheism to the fullest extent possible. On the other hand, he distanced these other nations from the Holy Land, which was promised to the children of Yitzchak and Ya'akov, in order that the Chosen Nation would not be threatened by assimilation with their cousins. However, the aforementioned Kings of Yehuda married women who helped fill the Holy Land with the idolatry of Ba'al. This lack of care in choosing proper mates for the kings of Yehuda almost brought about the extinction of the House of David. As Chazal tell us: "Once Assa took the daughter of Omri as a wife for Yehoshafat, a decree was made on the House of David that it should perish along with the House of Achav (Omri's son)" (Seder Olam Rabba 17; Tosefta, Sota 12:3). Let us all pray that we merit success in the war against assimilation, and that, along with it, we will see the restoration of the House of David to its proper glory. P'ninat Mishpat – Returning Lost Objects- V- Proof of Ownership We tend to think of the readiness of the finder of a lost object (aveida) to hand it over to the person who comes to claim it as an act of generosity. However, this "generosity" can, at times, be a sign of shirking responsibility. As mentioned before, one who retrieves an aveida becomes responsible to look after it. Not only does that mean that he ensure that it doesn't get lost or broken, but also that it is not returned to the wrong person. How does one know that the aveida belongs to the one who claims it? There are two basic ways to identify an object. One is by taking note of one or more identifying signs (simanim), such as a scratch, color, size, etc. Another is to recognize it in a more general, overall way (tviut eina). The latter is more reliable (that is the way we identify our friends and relatives). On the other hand, it is hard to know whether the person who says he recognizes the aveida is telling the truth. Tviut eina can be corroborated in two ways. The simplest is if unconnected witnesses are the ones who recognize the aveida and identify its owner (Bava Matzia 27b). (Some commentators discuss the problem of how the witnesses' identification precludes the possibility that after the witnesses saw the object by the supposed owner, he sold it to the person who lost it.) The second case one can rely on the identification is if the supposed owner is a talmud chacham (ibid.24a) or another who is known not to lie (Aruch Hashulchan, CM 262:25). The system of identifying the object with simanim (without allowing the claimant to view the aveida) is also valid. However, the gemara (ibid 27 a-b) is unsure whether average simanim are sufficient from a Torah perspective or whether we rely upon them based on a rabbinic institution. The rationale for a rabbinic institution is that people who lose things would prefer that finders return objects based on simanim and not demand more conclusive proof. This is because the real owner's chances of getting the aveida back are higher if he can vie for the chance to give the best simanim than if we raise the bar of acceptable evidence so high that even he will not be able to prove the ownership. Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l( Marriage Between People from Families with Occurrences of a Serious Disease- Part I (based on Amud Ha'y'mini, siman 33( [This article, written in the 50's, discusses a case of a couple contemplating marriage, where each came from a family with two occurrences of the same severe disease. We do not know what the disease was, but by context, we can presume that it was an uncommon one. Otherwise, two occurrences in the extended family would not be significant. The last decades have seen an explosion of knowledge about the genetic factor in illness and the likelihood of a disease occurring in a family with a history of the disease. It is likely that, had Rav Yisraeli's response been written today, it would have incorporated medical research. However, there are still diseases which appear to have a connection between family history and chance of occurrence, but more exact information is unavailable. The following ideas still apply to those cases[ The Shulchan Aruch (Even Haezer 2:7) says that a person should not marry a woman from a family of lepers or other serious disease in a case where the disease has occurred three times in her family, which creates a chazaka. The Rif (on Yevamot 64b) explains that after two occurrences, it is permitted to marry into the family because we assume that "two times is just by chance." At first glance, then, there is no problem in our case. Since in each family there are only two occurrences, each one is considered by chance and we need not take note of either family history. However, the Ba'er Heitev (ad loc.:15) questions the Shulchan Aruch's ruling based on the Shulchan Aruch's own ruling regarding determining a family history of babies dying as a result of circumcision. There it is enough that the sons of two sisters died in order to forbid a brit on their cousin. As the gemara (ibid.) equates the halacha regarding these two issues, we appear to have a contradiction. The Pitchei Teshuva (ad loc.) distinguishes between the context by a brit, where the family history is with the mother's sister's children and the context of the lepers where "the family," implying the more extended family, is mentioned. By close relatives, it is similar to the case of a woman's own children dying, where two occurrences is enough, whereas, by the more extended family, only three occurrences are significant enough. Thus, if in our case, we are talking about the illness in a parent and a sibling, that is even closer than two siblings, and there should be a prohibition. However, we could make just the opposite claim. If only one side has the apparent tendency toward the disease, then the "healthy" family should avoid marrying in and should find a family without such a high likelihood of problem. But if both families have the problem, then each has the problem no matter whom they marry. But on second thought, this does not seem to be the case. Two occurrences do not indicate a certainty that a given child from this proposed match will have the disease. It only indicates a higher likelihood than we are happy with. But if both sides share the same disease, then there is an even greater likelihood that the joint children will have the disease, and we should not condone that increased risk. Additionally, we should note that it is evident from the sources [beyond our scope] that, in general, two occurrences create a safek (doubt) whether there is a chazaka. We deal with this doubt in the manner appropriate for the specific context (in this case, we are extra careful regarding danger). Thus, it is possible that the two cases indicate a trend in one family but are coincidence in the other. Therefore, how can one side take the risk of marrying into a family that has a more severe problem than they? [e continue next week.[ Ask the Rabbi Question: Shimon lent Levi $100, and then Levi worked for Shimon and deserved $100 for his work. If Shimon disputes the fee for his work, can Levi claim that the two financial obligations offset each other, and he is exempt from paying the loan, or must Levi pay back the loan and then make efforts to receive payment for the work? Answer: It is unclear from the question if there is an actual case which depends on the answer to this question, or if it is asked out of a thirst for Torah knowledge. We may not help one side get an upper hand in a financial dispute (see Choshen Mishpat 17). However, we have a responsibility to answer someone as to whether what he wants to do is permissible. You present two opposite possibilities: 1) the obligations offset each other; 2) they do not offset each other, and therefore Levi (the debtor/worker) has to pay. It is likely that neither possibility is correct, as we will explain, before we get to the bottom line. The gemara (Ketubot 110a) brings two opinions if, in a case where two people borrowed money from each other, both have to pay or neither does. The gemara explains that when the payments are totally identical, it is ridiculous to just have payment change hands. It also rules that when there is a difference between the terms of the payments, the one who has the preferable terms can demand that each pay the other according to their rules. The relatively local machloket is whether there is a difference between the payments in the given case. We see then that the two opposing obligations do not simply cancel each other out. There are complex discussions of this rule's applications. Here is one example. If a defendant responds to an unproved claim by saying that he is unsure whether he ever became obligated, he is exempt. But if he was obligated and is unsure if he paid, then he must pay. What if he is unsure if the definite obligation was preceded by an equal obligation of his counterpart to him? The K'tzot Hachoshen (75:5) says that because of the rule that obligations do not cancel each other out, we obligate the defendant to pay the definite obligation, and he loses the doubtful counter claim. We do not say that because he may have been owed first, he may never have been obligated. The Netivot (75:5.) argues that the rule of not offsetting does not apply here. He seems to contradict himself in 59:1, and the solutions are complex (see Pitchei Teshuva 75:10). If there is no canceling, then Levi should ostensibly have to pay, as you suggest. However, the Shulchan Aruch (75:7) rules that if one responds to a monetary claim with the counter claim that the plaintiff owes him also, he is exempt if neither has proof, as in effect he denies the claim that he owes money. Doesn't this undisputed halacha contradict what we have already seen? The answer seems to be based on the concept of tefisa (grabbing). There are times that one can "take the law into his own hands" and grab from the person who owes him in order to ensure payment. If nobody sees the claimant do so, the tefisa may even improve his chances in the din Torah (court case) (see Shach 4:2). On the other hand, there are limitations on when and to what extent one is allowed to take the law into his own hands, for practical and moral reasons (see Tumim 4:2 and many other sources, ad loc.). The details are well beyond our scope. However, you (and the Shulchan Aruch 75:7) describe a case where Levi does not have to grab. Rather he can temporarily withhold payment until the other party properly addresses his claims. This is permitted even though he owes money (we do not offset obligations), as withholding facilitates his attempt to receive money he (thinks he) knows he deserves. If this is a real case, we cannot rule if Levi deserves payment for his work. That needs to be worked out by agreement, or by a rav or a beit din, authorized by both parties to adjudicate, after hearing the claims of each. Harav Shaul Israeli zt"l Founder and President Deans: Harav Yosef Carmel Harav Moshe Ehrenreich ERETZ HEMDAH 5 Ha-Mem Gimmel St. P.O.B 36236 Jerusalem 91360 Tel/Fax: 972-2-5371485 Email: eretzhem@netvision.net.il web-site: www.eretzhemdah.org American Friends of Eretz Hemdah Institutions c/o Olympian 8 South Michigan Ave. Suite 605 Chicago, IL 60603 USA Our Taxpayer ID#: 36-4265359

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