Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Emor 5763

Hemdat Yamim Parshat Emor 8 Iyar 5763 ===================== This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated in honor of Rabbi Eli B. Greenwald on the occasion of his 72nd birthday. ====================================== Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbis to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship combined with community service, ensures that its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations resulting in an exceptionally strong connection to Jewish communities worldwide. ================================================ "Tell the Kohanim" / Harav Yosef Carmel Chazal conclude that Shaul sinned in one matter and had his kingdom rescinded, whereas David sinned in two and did not have his kingdom rescinded (Yoma 22b; see Rashi, ad loc.). This accounting of Shaul's downfall seems to be contradicted by Ezra Hasofer, author of Divrei Hayamim. There (I, 10:13-14) four sins are mentioned in Shaul's demise: "Shaul died (1) in his betrayal (ma'al) that he betrayed against Hashem that (2) he did not listen to Hashem's words and also (3) that he consulted ov (necromancy) and (4) did not consult in Hashem, and He had him killed and handed over the monarchy to David ben Yishai." The four sins are: 1) m'ilah from the ban on the property of Amalek; 2) that he did not wait for Shmuel in the war against the Pelishtim, as Hashem decreed (see Shmuel I 13:13); 3) resorting to necromancy; 4) destroying the kohanim of Nov, which caused him to be unable to use the urim v'tumim to consult Hashem (as they were removed by Evyatar, the sole survivor of the house of Achimelech, the kohen gadol). The simple answer to the contradiction is apparently the following. Shaul lost his kingdom already from the time of his first sin (his lack of patience in waiting for Shmuel's sacrifice before starting the battle). Without getting into the reasons, the gemara points out that David was forgiven for two serious sins without losing the kingdom. Let us concentrate on the phrase, "he did not consult Hashem and He had him killed" and the redundancy of "Shaul died ... He had him killed." The midrash (Vayikra Rabba 26) explains as follows. Hashem showed Moshe every generation and its judges, its kings, its sages, its leaders, ... In this framework, He showed Shaul and his sons falling by the sword in battle. When Moshe wondered how the first king of Israel could die such a disgraceful death, Hashem answered him with the first words of our parasha, "Tell the kohanim." It was the kohanim of Nov, says the midrash, who acted as prosecutors against Shaul and caused his death. We can now explain that the "extra" mention of Shaul's death in proximity to the sin of not consulting Hashem, which hints at his eradication of the kohanim of Nov, is particularly telling in this regard. Shaul fell by the sword, just as the kohanim did. If we look further, we will see that not only was Shaul's act heinous in its own right, but it was also ironically misplaced. Shaul was commanded to destroy Amalek without mercy "from man to woman, from infant to nursing baby, from bull to sheep, from camel to donkey" (Shmuel I, 15:3). The exact same words are used in context of the actual murder of the kohanim of Nov (ibid. 22:19). Shaul's mercy on the property of Amalek was misplaced, as he displayed cruelty against his own, and for this he paid dearly. Let us pray that Hashem bring about the fall of our true enemies and restore the kohanim to their proper station in the Beit Hamikdash. ======================================================= P'ninat Mishpat: A Question if Cash was Received (condensed from Piskei Din Rabbani'im, pp.25-35) Case: The plaintiff (=pl) would periodically give the defendant (=def) a check and receive cash in return soon thereafter. If cash were unavailable, def would right a note in his ledger that he owed the money. A certain time, def did not write down anything in his ledger, even though, according to pl, def did not give the cash. Def responded that in all eight years that they used this arrangement, it never occurred that he failed to immediately write down a debt. He is, therefore, sure that he gave the cash, although he doesn't actually remember doing so. Ruling: When a plaintiff is sure he is owed money and the defendant is unsure whether he ever owed the money, the defendant is exempt from paying. However, if the defendant admits to borrowing money and is unsure whether he paid back (and the plaintiff claims that he definitely did not), then he must pay (Bava Kama 118a; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 75:9). The question is then whether our case is like that of a doubt whether the money was ever owed or like a case where it is unclear if there was payment. To determine this, we must understand the logic behind the aforementioned distinction. The Rif (Bava Kama, ibid.) explains that when one piece of information is clear (that there was a loan) and the other is unclear (if there was payment), we give precedence to the clear and say that barring indications to the contrary, the lender must pay. In our case, then, since the check was definitely given and it is questionable whether the cash was, def would have to pay. The other approach is that if we know that there was once an obligation and we are unclear whether it was ever relieved, we continue with the chazaka (assumption) of obligation, unless the defendant claims that he definitely paid. In our case, if def gave the cash right away, as he suspects, then there was never a time of definite obligation, and, therefore, def would be exempt. [After analysis of several sources, it appears that] the matter is subject to an evenly weighted machloket between the Tumim and Panim Meirot (exempt) vs. the Chatam Sofer and Rashdam (obligated). There is an additional and stronger reason to exempt def. The Shach (CM 91:25) brings the Rosh's opinion (Shut 103:2) that if one always writes down obligations immediately in his ledger and didn't do so one time, we consider him as one who is sure that he is not obligated. This is the case over here. Although pl claims that, at times, def failed to write down an obligation, the fact that def contests this claim makes him considered as one who is sure that he is exempt. Thus, he does not have to pay when there is no proof against him. In circumstances of a claim against a claim or against a doubtful claim, the defendant must make a low-level oath (shvuat heset). Since def is unwilling to swear and our interest is that people not put themselves in the severe situation of a possible false oath, we will enforce a "compromise close to the actual law" and make def pay one third of the disputed money. ===================================================== Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l) Restoring Faded letters with a Chemical- Part I (condensed from Amud Hay'mini, Siman 41). The question arose in regard to the lettering of an old sefer Torah, which faded until its letters appeared red. A chemical, which is clear in color, causes the Torah's letters to revert to black, when applied to the old writing. Does use of this chemical fix a halachically invalidated sefer, ruin one, or not change its status? Let us begin the analysis. The gemara (Gittin 19b) discusses the case of a husband who gave a get which now looks like a blank piece of paper. When checked with "mei narah" (a chemical that makes writing reappear), it was revealed that the get was written with "mei milin" (a form of ink which is originally visible, but becomes invisible when dry). Shmuel says that we must be concerned of the possibility that the wife is divorced, because it is possible that at the time the get was given, the writing was visible. Tosafot (ad loc.) infers that if the ink had already "disappeared" at the time the get was given, it would not have been valid at all. What would the halacha be if the get were given after the writing was restored with mei narah? Is the restored writing considered writing or not? Let us consider that ink that disappears is not considered valid, as writing must be permanent. If so, how is mei milin valid before it vanishes, as Shmuel implies? It is because mei milin can be restored subsequently and is, thus, permanent. But this is logical only if we assume that the restored letters are not a new act of writing but a return to the status of the original writing. Thus, even if the restoration were done without the requirements of writing a get, the get would be valid. This conclusion is all the more clear from the Ritva's understanding. The Ritva, in contrast to the aforementioned Tosafot, understands that Shmuel discussed a case where the get was given when the writing was already invisible. Yet Shmuel felt that the get might still be valid. It is logical to entertain the possibility that the writing is valid even when invisible only if one holds clearly that after it is restored, it is unquestionably valid. It is apparent from the Beit Shmuel (124:23) that he also felt that ink which disappeared and was restored is halachic writing. The Shulchan Aruch (Even Haezer 124:9) says that one should wait to give a get until the ink dries. The Chalkat M'chokek (ad loc.:24) cites the Mordechai who explains this halacha as follows. Since when wet the ink is easily erased, it is not considered permanent writing. However, the Chelkat M'chokek says that perhaps it is valid, because later on the lettering will be permanent. The Beit Shmuel (ad loc.:21) argues and says that we follow the situation only at the time that the get is given, not later. His proof is from our gemara, that a get given when the writing is not visible is invalid despite the fact that it can be restored. The only way one can prove from that gemara that we follow the present situation is if we assume that, after the writing is restored, it is considered valid. ============================================= Ask the Rabbi Question: Does a place of business require a mezuzah, and, if so, does one make a beracha when affixing it? Answer: This answer refers to the situation where the owner of the business is Jewish. Several other permutations exist, which are beyond our present scope (see Minchat Yitchak II, 83). The gemara (Yoma 11b) says that in order for a structure to be obligated in mezuzah, it must be connected with a use of dira (dwelling). The problem is that it is not always so simple to determine what uses are considered of that type. The Rambam (Mezuzah 6:9) says that a store in the market is not obligated in mezuzah, and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 286:11) brings his opinion as halacha. This is despite the fact that both of them rule that storage areas for straw or lumber are required to have a mezuzah. The Taz (ad loc.:10) explains that the type of use that one makes of the storage rooms is appropriate for both day and night, as opposed to the commercial activities of the store, which are limited to the daytime. Other distinctions can be made, including that the storage rooms are in the proximity of and an extension of the use of one's home (see B'er Moshe II, 85). Along the lines of the Taz's distinction, the Pitchei Teshuva (ad loc.:9) cites the opinion of the Yad Haketana that if the store houses the owner's merchandise during the night as well then it would certainly require a mezuzah. Even if one does not feel that storage of merchandise or equipment during off-hours is sufficient to turn a place of business into a dira, if the business or factory operates well into the night, it is more certain that one would need to put a mezuzah (B'er Moshe, ibid.). A further reason to obligate a mezuzah is the approach of the Bach, Perisha (Yoreh Deah 286:22), and Yad Haketana (ibid.), according to whom, the Rambam (and likely, the Shulchan Aruch) were misunderstood. The Rambam (ibid.) rules that a sukka and living quarters on a ship are not obligated in mezuzah because they are not for permanent dwelling. The Rambam can be understood, in the same context, to be referring specifically to a store in a market, which was open only on special market days. (This was a common arrangement in the gemara's time- see Bava Batra 22a). According to this approach, regular, full-time places of work would be obligated in mezuzah. In summary, there is ample justification for Jewish owned places of work to affix a mezuzah. Regarding a beracha, the approach of several recent poskim is the safe approach, that it is better not to make a beracha because of the doubt in the matter (see Minchat Yitzchak, ibid.; Chovat Hadar 3:8; Pitchei Shearim 286:(132,133,138)). We recall that our mentor, Harav Yisraeli z.t.l. instructed us to make a beracha when affixing the mezuzah by our office. However, we cannot say with certainty if that was an across-the-board ruling or if it depended on the type of activity and conditions in the specific place of work. Harav Shaul Israeli zt"l Founder and President Deans: Harav Yosef Carmel Harav Moshe Ehrenreich ERETZ HEMDAH 5 Ha-Mem Gimmel St. P.O.B 36236 Jerusalem 91360 Tel/Fax: 972-2-5371485 Email: eretzhem@netvision.net.il web-site: www.eretzhemdah.org American Friends of Eretz Hemdah Institutions c/o Olympian 8 South Michigan Ave. Suite 605 Chicago, IL 60603 USA Our Taxpayer ID#: 36-4265359

Main > Parashat Shavua
Eretz_Hemdah