Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Ki Tisa 5763

Hemdat Yamim Parshat Ki Tisa 20 Adar I 5763 =============================== This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to the memory of R' Meir ben Yechezkel Shraga Brachfeld o.b.m. =============================== Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbis to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship combined with community service, ensures that its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations resulting in an exceptionally strong connection to Jewish communities worldwide. The Effects of the Chet Haegel / Harav Yosef Carmel We know that the punishment for the chet haegel (the Golden Calf) has been a part of Jewish tragedy throughout the generations (see Shemot 32:33-34 and Yalkut Shimoni, Ki Tisa 393). But in the short term after the sin, it had a broader affect than many know. There is a famous machloket among rishonim if the commandment to construct the mishkan (tabernacle) preceded the chet haegel or followed it and was actually necessary because of the sin. The philosophical background behind that machloket is the question whether the service of sacrifices is the ideal one or became necessary as an antidote to Bnei Yisrael's tendencies, as uncovered during the chet haegel. The Meshech Chuchma and some of the Gra's disciples paved a new approach to this issue. They are of the opinion that the command to erect the mishkan did precede the sin but that there were changes that resulted from the accompanying spiritual deterioration. Let us give a halachic consequence of this concept. In the beginning of our parasha, in close proximity after the discussion of the mishkan, the Torah writes, "Only (ach), my Shabbatot you should keep" (Shemot 31:13). From there, R. Yossi Hag'lili learns that on Shabbat, work is sometimes permitted, namely when it is necessary for pikuach nefesh (saving lives). The p'sukim in the beginning of Parashat Vayakhel (ibid. 35:3-4) bring the commandment of Shabbat before the retelling of the command to build the mishkan. The Rabbis learn from that order that Shabbat is not to be violated even by the construction of the mishkan. But this is difficult. Why can't we learn from the opposite order in Ki Tisa that the mishkan precedes Shabbat? According to the approach of the Meshech Chuchma, we have an answer to this question. Before the chet haegel, when the mishkan was to have been on a higher level, the construction was to have been continued even on Shabbat. This is hinted to in the beginning of our parasha, which is before the sin. By Vayakhel, after the mishkan's spiritual downscaling that was caused by the sin, the halacha became that Shabbat had precedence over the building of the mishkan. ==================================== P'ninat Mishpat - Distancing Damages- Part IX - Light and Air Reuven has a window in his wall, and his neighbor, Shimon, wants to build a wall opposite the window in a way that minimizes Reuven's air and light. Shimon must distance the wall 4 amot (approximately 6 feet) from Reuven's window (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 154:21). The commentaries explain that this not a case where the "damager" must distance his damage, because Shimon is not damaging but is simply building on his property. The fact that Reuven can no longer use Shimon's property as a free conduit for light and air is Reuven's problem and should not limit how Shimon uses his land (see K'tzotz Hachoshen 155:9). In order to force Shimon to distance his wall, Reuven must have a chazaka (an acquired right) which gives him special rights in Shimon's property (S'ma 154:49). Otherwise, we tell Reuven that if air is important to him, he shouldn't have built his window so close to his neighbor's property. How does one acquire such a chazaka? One way is to have built his window at a time when no one owned the adjacent field. Even though he didn't acquire the adjacent land, he did acquire certain rights in it, i.e. the right to use it as a free conduit for air and light. Another way is simply to pay for or otherwise receive permission from Shimon to build the window, with the understanding that Shimon will enable him to make full, normal use of that window. A third way of acquiring a chazaka also explains how we can usually demand more than 4 amot of space, based on municipal zoning laws. The Beit Yosef (CM 155, cited in S'ma 154:35) brings the concept that when one buys land from the king, there is an unspoken understanding that the king gives him rights in the neighboring properties which enable him to make the most effective use of his field (his neighbors have reciprocal rights in his property). Our king, for this matter, is the appointed governmental agencies, who (should ) determine what standards will create optimal living conditions for the majority of the population. This includes how close to another's property one can build. ====================================== Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l) Compromises in Religious Legislation- part I (condensed from Amud Hay'mini, siman 11) [At times, in order to solve a communal, religious problem, one is demanded to accept an unacceptable situation. An example is the question whether to support legislation to ban public transportation on Shabbat throughout Israel, excluding Haifa. May we improve the situation in the country as a whole, at the expense of the people (including the religious) of that city? The political assumption was that if compromise was not agreed upon, then matters would only get worse.] The mishna in Terumot (7:12) writes: "If idol worshippers say to a group of women: 'Hand over one of you so that we will defile her, or else we will defile all of you,' it is better that all be defiled, and they should not give over one soul from Israel." What is the basis of the prohibition to hand over someone if the same outcome is expected for her whether she is given or taken? It is difficult to say that it is because we are not allowed to aid in the violation of aveirah, even when it will be done without our involvement. After all, the defiled woman is not active in any sin, and we are not obligated to protect idol worshippers from sin? Why don't we take the overall picture into account, as we do when we tell one to violate a single Shabbat to enable another to keep many Shabbatot? Rav Kook (Mishpat Kohen, pg. 306- ) brings two explanations. First of all, since the Torah connects between matters of life and death and matters of sexual purity, we imploy the rule that one does not make calculations of relative gain and loss. Rather, we cannot give in on one life or one woman's purity even when the price of refusal is greater than that of capitulation. Another possibility is that if the women are defiled by force, then no Jew was active in the aveirah, as opposed to a case of handing one over, which includes our active involvement. Each of these answers has problems [beyond our scope], but we can eliminate the question if we notice that the prohibition is limited, not sweeping. The Rash on the mishna (ibid.) says that it is evident from the Yerushalmi that if the idol worshippers specify which woman they demand to be handed over, she is given over instead of waiting for them to take all of the women. The apparent explanation is as follows. If it is a question of a tragedy befalling one person or the whole group, we prefer to limit it to one person. That is the case when one woman is spelled out, and, therefore, she is handed over. But when no one is spelled out, the decision needs to be made whom to choose. At that point, with a question of one versus another, we have no right to decide. Therefore, no one is given over, despite the disadvantages this refusal to decide brings on. We must point out though that the Rash's citation of the Yerushalmi is problematic. Firstly, the Yerushalmi does not deal with surrendering a woman to be defiled, but with handing over a person to be killed. Secondly, the halacha cited is only one opinion. Reish Lakish argues and says that the specified person can be given over only if he is guilty of the death penalty. Indeed, the Rambam (Yesodei Hatorah 5:5) accepts Reish Lakish's opinion that one does not give over an innocent person even if the idol worshippers single him or her out. [We continue next week.] Ask the Rabbi Question: Last Friday night, my electricity blew. To save my chulent, which was on an electric hot plate, I brought it to a neighbor and put it on her blech. Was that okay? Answer: In order to take a pot from off the fire and place it on the fire, there are several requirements. Among them is that one must remove the pot from the fire with the intention to return it and/or (see different opinions in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 253:2) that the pot remains in his hands the whole time. The application in your case depends on a simple chakira (analytical dilemma). Does one need a positive connection between past and future stays on the fire by holding the pot and planning to return it? In your case, when the electricity went out, nothing positive demonstrated the pot would be going to your neighbor's blech. But perhaps food that was on a fire may remain or be transferred to another fire unless it was actively removed in a way that makes it unfit for return. Over here, you never removed it at all. Explicit discussion of equivalent scenarios, which include age-old cases like a flame going out or a pot falling off the blech, is found primarily in the latest poskim. Harav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC IV 74.39) and Harav Sh. Z. Orbach (see Shemirat Shabbat K'hichata ch. 1, footnote 69) support the position that one's intention when putting up the food that it remain on the fire, is sufficient unless one consciously removed the pot. Shmirat Shabbat K'hilchata (in the body of the work, 1:23) prefers that one not rely on this logic without additional room for leniency. He suggests that one put the pot on the new heat source, not directly on a blech, but separated by an overturned pot or plate. There are other points of leniency and stringency that one should consider. The Rama (OC 253:2) says that it is possible to rely on the Ran's novel opinion, that if food is removed on Shabbat from a flame without intention to return it, he can return it to a blech (or a non-adjustable hot plate), in case of great need. Also, if one acts quickly, he can obviate the problem. Although the electricity is the cause of the heat, halachically, the hot plate's surface is the heat source for the pot. Thus, if one takes the pot into his hands to bring it to the neighbors when the hot plate is still hot, then it is permitted, like moving any pot from one blech to another. The fact that the surface would have cooled off soon does not change that. (Some Sefardic poskim never allow moving food from one heat source to another- see Yalkut Yosef 253:(10)). One must make sure that all of the food in the chulent pot, including beans and bones that are eaten, are fully cooked before returning them to a blech and that the food is still hot (slightly, for Ashkenazim; yad soledet bo, for Sefardim). Otherwise, there would be actual cooking, not just rabbinic issues of hachzara. =========================================== Hemdat Yamim is published weekly in conjunction with Gemara Berura. ================================== Harav Shaul Israeli zt"l Founder and President Deans: Harav Yosef Carmel Harav Moshe Ehrenreich ERETZ HEMDAH 5 Ha-Mem Gimmel St. P.O.B 36236 Jerusalem 91360 Tel/Fax: 972-2-5371485 Email: eretzhem@netvision.net.il web-site: www.eretzhemdah.org American Friends of Eretz Hemdah Institutions c/o Olympian 8 South Michigan Ave. Suite 605 Chicago, IL 60603 USA Our Taxpayer ID#: 36-4265359

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