Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Naso 5764

Hemdat Yamim Parshat Naso 9 Sivan 5764 **************************************************************************** ********* This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to the memory of R' Meir ben Yechezkel Shraga Brachfeld o.b.m., Yitzchak Eliezer Ben Avraham Mordechai Jacobson o.b.m. **************************************************************************** **********************************************Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbis to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship combined with community service, ensures that its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations resulting in an exceptionally strong connection to Jewish communities worldwide. **************************************************************************** *********************************************** When Second Place is First-Rate Harav Yosef Carmel One of the questions that troubled Chazal in our parasha is how the head of the Tribe of Yisachar, Yaakov's ninth son and Leah's fifth, merited to bring the special korbanot (sacrifices) to inaugurate the Mishkan (Tabernacle) second among the tribal heads. Looking at the p'sukim and Chazal's comments on them, we find several answers. While the korbanot of most of the tribal heads were introduced with the word "korbano (his sacrifice)," in Yisachar's case it says "hikriv et korbano (he brought his sacrifice)," with a letter yud missing from "hikriv"(Bamidbar 7:18). This brings us to our first explanation. With the missing letter, the word can be read as a command, "hakrev." When the Tribe of Reuven (the firstborn) complained about the snub of their not being among the first to sacrifice, Moshe responded that Hashem had commanded that Yisachar sacrifice second (Sifrei, Bamidbar 52). But what was the specific reason that Yisachar merited such recognition? That brings us to our next explanation. It was Yisachar who came up with the idea that the tribes should provide wagons to transport the Mishkan from one place of encampment to the next. This fact is hinted in the change of name of one of the tribe's patriarchs, Yov, who is called Yashuv in Divrei Hayamim (I, 7:1). This hints to the fact that he came up with an idea. A further midrash (Sifrei, ibid.) says that it was this same initiative of Netanel, head of the tribe, that endowed the tribe as a whole with a special characteristic. They are praised as being "those who know wisdom for the times, to know what Yisrael should do" (Divrei Hayamim I, 12:33). We also have a rule that he who runs away from honor will have honor run after him. The missing yud in "hikriv" may hint at Yisachar's humility. They did not seek a prestigious position, and, as a reward, they received one. Chazal also take note of the name of the tribal head, Netanel, which is made up of two words: to give and the Name of Hashem. The Midrash Aggada (Bamidbar 1:8) learns the name as a reference to the fact that the tribe members gave their hearts to the study of Torah, which Hashem had given over to Bnei Yisrael. Yaakov also referred to Yisachar's willingness to muster all their energy to carry the load of Torah leadership (Bereishit 49:15), in merit of which they deserved the great honor bestowed upon them. Finally, Chazal inferred from the name of Yashuv in the context of its mention later in our sefer (Bamidbar 26:24) that Yisachar was praised for establishing courts already during the years in Egypt (Sifrei, ad loc.). This important, trailblazing step, which they took to ensure justice before the rest of the tribes and before they were commanded, was recognized with the honor of bringing korbanot before the rest, as well. To summarize, we see that showing initiative, a spirit of volunteerism, acceptance of Torah leadership, and establishment of batei din, along with humility, were ingredients of Yisachar's success. Let us all strive to be students of Yisachar. **************************************************************************** ***************************************** P'ninat Mishpat- Helping a Man Get Out of Jail If He Gives a Get (based on Piskei Din Rabbaniim- vol. XI, pp. 300-308) Case: A husband is in jail for four years after conviction for drug dealing. Beit din instructed him to give a get, but he refused. During the hearing in beit din, the husband acted wildly, spitting at and threatening the dayanim. Beit din has the ability to reduce his chances of early discharge for good behavior by informing the authorities of his behavior in court. They would prefer to make a deal with the man to withhold the complaint if he gives a get. Would that linkage make the get he would be pressured into a get m'useh (coerced)? Opinion #1: Although placing different types of sanctions on one who withholds a get can cause a get to be m'useh and invalid (depending on the case and the various opinions), the matter is different when one gives a get in order to save himself from a sanction which exists independently of the question of the get. The Rivash ( Shut 127) discusses a case where beit din was taking harsh steps against a husband to force him to fulfill his marital obligations to his wife. He ruled that if, under the circumstances, the husband decides to divorce her, it is not considered a get m'useh. The Rivash compares this to a case where an incarcerated man is offered freedom if he gives a get to his wife, which he assumes simply does not harm that the get's validity. The idea is that we consider such a get a reward, rather than considering its withholding a penalty. However, later authorities argued about the extent of the Rivash's leniency. The Tashbetz (I,1) says that the get given to extricate a man from unrelated sanctions is valid only if the sanctions were implemented halachically. On the other hand, the Ra'anach (Shut 43) says that as long as the sanctions were not imposed in order to force the get, it does not make a difference if they were imposed properly or not. Our case may depend on which opinion one accepts. It is difficult for beit din to conclude that the husband's imprisonment was done according to halacha. Thus, if they help the husband get out of jail earlier (by not reporting his behavior in court, which in other cases has been punished by the courts) only if he gives a get, at least the Ra'anach would say that it is valid. The Mabit (II, 138) understands the Tashbetz strictly and also says that if the husband can avoid the sanctions only by giving the get, then it is a problem of get m'useh. However, in our case, the Mabit would likely agree that there is not a problem. The jail sentence is already in place, with the only question being if the prisoner deserves a special gift of early release, which is not an automatic right. To withhold a favor is not a problem of get m'useh even if it leaves the husband in an unenviable situation. **************************************************************************** ******************************************** Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l) Paternity in Cases of Artificial Insemination - part I (from Chavot Binyamin, siman 107) With the development of modern, medical technology, it has become more common for women who are having trouble conceiving to use artificial insemination to conceive. [Ed. note- of course, now we have more advanced systems.] By this, we mean that the husband's sperm is injected into the wife's uterus. (It is halachically advisable that it is the husband's, specifically, although even in this manner, there are those who forbid the matter.) The question is: what is the "father's" halachic connection to the child? It is also possible to freeze sperm and preserve it for later use, and so it is possible that the sperm will be implanted into the uterus after the husband's death. This raises further questions as to whether such a situation does not preclude a halachic relationship between genetic father and child. The main Talmudic source dealing with a similar type of impregnation is the gemara in Chagiga (14-15). "They asked Ben Zoma: Is a "pregnant virgin" fit to marry a kohen gadol? Do we consider the possibility that [she had relations in such a way that she appears to still be a virgin] or is that unlikely? He said to them that it is unlikely, and we have to consider that she may have conceived in a bath (Rashi- a bath which contained sperm)." The commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch discuss the status in a case where a woman conceived from sperm in which she had soaked, regarding whether the source of the sperm would be the father of the child or not. The Chelkat M'chokek (1:8) was unsure "whether the father would fulfill in this way the obligation of p'ru u'r'vu (procreation) and whether he was considered a son for all sorts of things." The Beit Shmuel (1:20) cites the Haghot Has'mak that forbids a woman from lying on a sheet that a man other than her husband laid on, lest she become impregnated in such a way that could cause the offspring to marry a sister from someone that he did not realize was his father. The Beit Shmuel deduces from there that the source of the sperm is considered the halachic father of the child. The Taz (ad loc.) rejects this as a proof that a sperm donor can fulfill the mitzva of p'ru u'r'vu by such means. He says that the Haghot Has'mak may be a stringency that cannot be relied upon to create an exemption for the "father" from any further obligation of p'ru u'r'vu, especially because in the described case the man was not active in the possible fulfillment of the mitzva. The Birkei Yosef (ad loc.:13) also raises doubts whether the Haghot Has'mak intends to rule that the offspring would be related to the sperm source's family and says that he might only object to our being unaware of the child's genealogy. (What we so see from the gemara in Chagiga and the Haghot Has'mak is that even if a woman is impregnated from a man with whom she may not have relations, she and the child are not disqualified as if illicit relations had taken place. If, however, the father had the type of disqualification that is transferred to the next generation even without a new act of illicit relations, such as mamzerut, then, [ed. note- to the extent that we relate the child to the genetic father], the child would also carry that disqualification.) A few Acharonim bring gemarot that search for cases of uncommon family relationships and assume that they cannot exist without incest being violated. If impregnation in a bath (the ancient concept equivalent to artificial insemination) would create a full family relationship between genetic father and child, those gemarot should have mentioned that possibility. [Ed. note- we have left out the proofs because of their complexity.] Therefore, we would have to conclude that there is significant doubt about the halachic connection between the genetic father and child in this case. **************************************************************************** ********************************************* Ask the Rabbi Question: What are the general rules of distant relatives serving as witnesses on a ketuba? In particular, I want to know about the bride's mother's sister's husband (uncle through marriage). Answer: We will start with background and some basic rules. The laws of relatives being invalid to testify about their relatives are derived from the following pasuk: "Fathers shall not be killed because of sons, and sons shall not be killed because of fathers" (Devarim 24:16). The gemara determines that "because of" refers to testimony by relatives and that these laws apply to all forms of testimony (Sanhedrin 28a). It also derives the extent of the relationship that disqualifies through derivations from linguistic intricacies. The Shulchan Aruch brings the details within the general laws of monetary law (Choshen Mishpat 33) (a ketuba is primarily a monetary document), although the laws are basically the same for the marriage itself (Even Haezer 42:5). The basic halachic terminology is as follows. A first-level relationship (parent/child; siblings) is called rishon b'rishon. The next generation (first cousins) is called sheni b'sheni. They may not testify for one another (or together). Second cousins are shlishi b'shlishi and are valid. Halacha also deals with mixed generations. For example, an uncle is a rishon b'sheni, which is a closer relationship than cousins. We will soon see what difference this could make. What about relationships through marriage, as in our case? The gemara (ibid. 28b) derives from a pasuk on incest, which not only forbids the wife of one's uncle but even calls her an aunt, that isha k'ba'ala and ba'al k'ishto, relations by marriage are much the same as those of blood relatives. There are two areas of practical difference. In some borderline relationships like shlishi b'rishon (testifying for a great uncle or vice versa) if the relationship is by marriage then they can testify for or with each other (Shulchan Aruch, CM 33:3). Additionally, in the relationship of cousins (sheni b'sheni), if they are double in-laws, then they can testify. In other words, husbands of two female first cousins may testify together (ibid.:4), although this too should be avoided (Rama, ad loc.). Regarding double in-laws by rishon b'sheni, which, as we said, is closer, there are two opinions in the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) and the Rama is lenient b'dieved (after the fact). By testifying at a relative's wedding, the situation is always of a single in-law for the following reason. Although the groom will only be the uncle's double in-law, in our case, the ketuba's witnesses are testifying about both the chatan and the kallah. Regarding the bride, he is only a single in-law and is invalid. What is possible is that two people who are double in-laws will testify together about an unrelated bride and groom, and the aforementioned opinions apply. We should point out that decisions regarding witnesses are the domain of the mesader kiddushin (=mk) (officiating rabbi). Whereas the Sheva Berachot, while important, do not affect the validity of the marriage, kosher witnesses are required for a kosher marriage, or, in this case, a valid ketuba, which in turn is (rabbinically) required for the couple to live together. As the mk is responsible to ensure that everything is done properly, he should be allowed the opportunity to make calm, informed decisions and not be pressured to accept someone just because the family feels close to him. In addition to the laws of relatives, witnesses should be beyond suspicion of sins that could render them invalid. In the case of a ketuba, they should preferably have a working knowledge of the language and basic laws of a ketuba. Let us use your case as an example (which occurs). The family wants the uncle to get an honor, but the Sheva Berachot are taken. They present the uncle to the mk, who has a lot on his mind. The mk asks if he is related, but, being told that he is a distant relative, he figures that means second cousin or beyond and continues. But, as we saw, halachically, this uncle (by marriage) is not distant at all. Harav Shaul Israeli zt"l Founder and President Deans: Harav Yosef Carmel Harav Moshe Ehrenreich ERETZ HEMDAH 5 Ha-Mem Gimmel St. P.O.B 36236 Jerusalem 91360 Tel/Fax: 972-2-5371485 Email: eretzhem@netvision.net.il web-site: www.eretzhemdah.org American Friends of Eretz Hemdah Institutions c/o Olympian 8 South Michigan Ave. Suite 605 Chicago, IL 60603 USA Our Taxpayer ID#: 36-4265359

Main > Parashat Shavua
Eretz_Hemdah