Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Pinhas

Hemdat Yamim Parshat Pinchas 19 Tammuz 5762 =========================== This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to the memory of R' Meir ben Yechezkel Shraga Brachfeld o.b.m. ======================================= Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbi's to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship coupled with community service, ensures its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations and the strongest connection to Jewish communities worldwide. ================================================== Peaceful Violence?! Not only should Divine reward be given to the righteous, but it should also be appropriate. We know that David was deprived from building the Beit Hamikdash because of the blood he shed (Divrei Hayamim I, 28:3), even though he did so in justified battles. Metal instruments may not be employed in building an altar (Shemot 20:22) because of the incongruence of the life extending and the life taking. Yet, Pinchas had a surprising reward for his extra-judicial slaying of Zimri and Kuzbi. He merited becoming a kohen, a status which had alluded him as he fell through the historical cracks (Zevachim 101b). Even though his act of zealotry was praiseworthy, wasn't the specific reward somewhat inappropriate? The first thing we should notice is that the Torah stresses that the direct result of Pinchas' action was life, not death. While it is clear from context that Pinchas killed Zimri and Kuzbi, never does the Torah say so in so many words. Bamidbar 25:8 says that he stabbed them and as a result ... the plague stopped. Bamidbar 25:11,13 describes his actions only as saving Bnei Yisrael from destruction and bringing them atonement. Thus, the net result was saving lives, which is appropriate for a kohen. But didn't Pinchas still act violently? The Netziv points out that, indeed, the Torah needs to stress that Pinchas was provided with a covenant of peace (25:11), which shielded him from the negative impact that even a justified act of violence can have. But why was he deserving of this special treatment? The Netziv, infers from the description of the p'sukim that his zealotry, which we are told was for G-d's sake, that Pinchas acted ach v'rak l'shem shamayim (only and solely for Heaven's sake). But what does it mean that Pinchas acted solely for Heaven's sake? Would we have thought that he also had an old score to settle with Zimri?! It is worthwhile to consider the psychology of human reactions. If a normal, righteous and zealous Jew (these traits are neither necessarily related nor are they mutually exclusive) reacts harshly to religious desecration, much of his reaction is for Heaven's sake. But, as a person who takes his religion seriously, an affront to the Torah is also a personal affront to him. A certain person fumes over the political activities of a rival group, who, for argument's sake, does not seem to care about Eretz Yisrael. He certainly is acting for the sake of Hashem, His people, and His land. But doesn't the affront to his personal concerns, pride, and value system play a role? Regarding a normal, fine, upstanding person, the answer is yes. It is only an unusually great person, like Pinchas, who can do things solely for Heaven's sake and who deserves reward in unusually profound ways. The rest of us can still consider ourselves as acting primarily for Heaven's sake (hopefully), but we should examine our reactions to see if they aren't too harsh and try to concentrate on Hashem more than on our own feelings. ================================================== P'ninat Mishpat - Some More Bibliographical Notes- Even Haezer As we have seen throughout our discussions, Jewish family law is also part of the realm of dayanut. The section of the Tur and, subsequently, the Shulchan Aruch that deals with these matters is called "Even Haezer." The Tur explains that the second word is related to the first description of the first woman, Chava, who was called an eizer (helper) for Adam. Apparently, the first word is connected to the name of the entire work Arba'ah Haturim, which refers to the stones in the choshen of the kohen gadol. Of course, a stone is an even in Hebrew. The two words together, Even Haezer, refer to a monument which Shmuel erected to recognize the help Hashem had provided for Bnei Yisrael in defeating the Plishtim (Shmuel I, 7:12). Like Orach Chayim, Even Haezer employs a clearly sequential order in regard to the building of a family. First, it states the obligation to form a family and discusses whom it is permitted or forbidden to marry. The Tur and Shulchan Aruch then discuss how to affect the various stages of marriage, kiddushin and nisuim. The next major topic is the mutual obligations between husbands and wives, personally and financially. The last major topic deals with the breaking up of the family unit, primarily through divorce but also through the death of the husband, which could lead to chalitza or yibum. The sefer ends with the tragic possibility of dealing with the aftermath of rape or adultery. ================================================== Ask the Rabbi Question: I am a waiter in a catering hall, and I am often unable to daven Mincha or Maariv before or after work, respectively. Should I take off from my job to go to a local minyan. I am not sure if I will get docked pay for going or if I will lose my job if I am caught or demand to go? Answer: Several important questions revolve around conflicting responsibilities to our fellow man vs. to our Maker. There is no one all-inclusive answer to the issue, but there are sources on a variety of cases. Tefilla b'tzibur (davening with a minyan) is very important (see Berachot 8a). Although there are indications that it is just a way to fulfill the mitzva of tefilla more fully (b'hidur), Rav Moshe Feinstein z.t.l. understood it as an independent obligation (Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim II, 27). In any case, some parameters of the necessary sacrifice to make it to minyan are mentioned in the poskim. One must travel up to 18 minutes in order to attend a minyan (Shulchan Aruch, OC 90:16; Mishna Berura, ad loc.:52). If going to a minyan will cost one money (apparently, beyond small expenses like a few ounces of gas), he is not required to go. However, if it is just that he can gain money by missing minyan, he should attend minyan (Mishna Berura 90:29). If one has a set job, from which salary will be withheld for leaving for minyan, this is considered a monetary loss and is not required. However, a ben Torah who is in a good financial situation should consider whether making it to a minyan doesn't justify a small reduction in pay. Whenever one takes a job, he factors in "quality of life" considerations, besides salary. Among personal and religious factors, unique to shomrei mitzvot and b'nei Torah, should be the matter of tefilla b'tzibur. When one has responsibilities at work, he is required by halacha to take them very seriously. Berachot 16a poignantly illustrates how Chazal were prepared to lower certain religious obligations (of positive mitzvot) to avoid infringing upon the careful fulfillment of his responsibilities to his employer. Thus, sneaking out is not a halachic option. That same gemara mentions that if the employer is not bothered by the employee's normal fulfillment of tefillot and berachot, then he should daven and bentch normally. Therefore, you should bring up the matter politely with your boss (without risking your job) and see whether something can be worked out (e.g. you can offer to come in early). You can also investigate whether you can find an early or late minyan, respectively, (certainly, if within an 18 minute radius) to obviate the problem. ================================================== Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l) Aliyah Against the Wishes of Parents - Part IV (condensed from Amud Hay'mini, siman 22) [We saw that one who is seriously needed by and helps his parent(s) should stay with him and not make aliyah. We will now discuss the case of a parent who opposes aliyah plans even though he does not need his child nearby.] We reiterate that this is not written as p'sak halacha. We seem to have two sources that a child does not listen to a parent's request which contradicts a mitzva. One source says that a mitzva has precedence over a parent's request, at least if there is no one else to do the mitzva in the child's place, because mitzvot should be the parent's concern, as well (Kiddushin 32a). Another source brings a pasuk that one is to revere his parents but also keep Shabbat, to teach that mitzvot have precedence (Yevamot 5b). Tosafot (ad loc.) understands that the pasuk of the latter is the source and the logic of the former is the rationale. Only one halacha exists, and it depends on if someone else can do the mitzva. However, Tosafot (Kiddushin, ibid.) understands that one doesn't have to listen to a parent when the request is not for his direct benefit. The Gra explains the Rama's (Yoreh Deah 240:25) ruling that a son does not have to accept his parent's opposition to his choice of a wife based on this logic. It is apparent from the order of presentation and language of the Rambam (Mamrim 6) and the Shulchan Aruch (YD 240) that they understand that these gemarot teach different halachot for different cases. When a person must choose to fulfill one of two positive mitzvot, the choice is normally his. The logic of a parent being responsible for mitzvot causes us to rule that kibud av gives way. However, if kibud av would require one to do a negative commandment, we should apply the general rule that positive commandments overcome negative ones. Therefore, we need the pasuk about keeping Shabbat even against a parent's wishes to preclude such a conclusion. When one combines the two sources, according to the Rambam, it turns out that the logic refers to a case where the two mitzvot conflict by chance, whereas the pasuk refers to a case where the parent directly commands the child not to do the mitzva. In such a case, it is not that the other mitzva overcomes kibud av but that the parent's request to violate the Torah is deemed invalid. A practical difference is when the contradicted mitzva is rabbinic. If the contradiction is indirect, kibud av, which is from the Torah, wins out. If the contradiction is a direct request of the parent, it is invalid even against a rabbinic law and even if someone else can accomplish the mitzva. In conclusion, one need not heed a parent's opposition to his child's aliyah plans, if it is for reasons other than his own needs. According to Tosafot, it is because the kibud av applies only to the parent's own needs. According to the Rambam, it is because his request not to fulfill the mitzva to live in Eretz Yisrael, which is at least rabbinic, is void. [Rav Yisraeli does not discuss the pertinent case of a parent who opposes aliyah out of understandable fear]. ********************************************* Harav Shaul Israeli zt"l Founder and President Deans: Harav Yosef Carmel Harav Moshe Ehrenreich ERETZ HEMDAH 5 Ha-Mem Gimmel St. P.O.B 36236 Jerusalem 91360 Tel/Fax: 972-2-5371485 Email: eretzhem@netvision.net.il web-site: www.eretzhemdah.org American Friends of Eretz Hemdah Institutions c/o Olympian 8 South Michigan Ave. Suite 605 Chicago, IL 60603 USA Our Taxpayer ID#: 36-4265359

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