Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Reah 5763

Hemdat Yamim Parshat Re'eh - 25 Av 5763 ************************* This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to the memory of R' Meir ben Yechezkel Shraga Brachfeld o.b.m. **************************************************** Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbis to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship combined with community service, ensures that its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations resulting in an exceptionally strong connection to Jewish communities worldwide. ************************************************************************ Brothers From "One" Father It is insufficient to understand the Torah's messages and commands, individually. We must also understand the connection between them. The Torah says: "You are sons to Hashem, your G-d; do not cut yourselves (lo titgod'du) and do not make a baldness between your eyes for the dead" (Devarim 14:1). What is the connection between our being sons of Hashem and these prohibitions? Rashi explains that self-mutilation over the death of a relative is not appropriate for the sons of Hashem, who must remain unblemished. This implies that if not for the high level of dignity we must maintain, it could be appropriate to show grief by damaging the body. But we must suffice with tearing our garments and other, tame acts of mourning. The Ramban connects the logic that "princes" must maintain dignity with the presentation of these laws elsewhere. In Vayikra (21:5), these prohibitions are written as if they apply only to kohanim. Indeed, although we are no kohanim, as children of Hashem, we have elements of kehuna, as well (see Shemot 19:6). Seforno takes a different approach to the relevance, in this context, of our connection to Hashem. He says that one should not be pained to the fullest extreme by the loss of a close relative, in light of the fact that our most valuable relationship, that with our Father in Heaven, remains intact. Rephrasing this idea, we should note that, while it is sadly possible that one is orphaned from both parents, he always maintain one of the three partners in his creation (see Kiddushin 30b). The more one feels a meaningful connection with his Maker, the more likely he is to feel solace. Perhaps part of the intent behind the prohibition on a mourner's self-mutilation is to remind one who has not fully internalized the idea that he is Hashem's son. At times, Chazal derive a halacha from the wording of a pasuk in a way that seems unrelated to the pasuk's simple meaning. One example is this pasuk of "lo titgod'du." The gemara (Yevamot 14a) derives from here that people should not form groups (agudot), in a manner that one group acts conspicuously differently from others in its area on halachic matters. At first glance, the drasha is based just on a play on words. However, based on Seforno's approach to the pasuk, there is a fundamental, underlying message that unites the two laws of lo titigod'du. If we are all connected to Hashem as sons, then we are brothers. As such, we should avoid acting in a way that antagonizes each other and causes familial strife. It is particularly inappropriate that our obligations to our Father, as delineated by halacha, which should unite us, will be the root cause of the discord among us. As we end the month of destruction, caused by unnecessary hatred, and approach the month of religious soul-searching, we need to contend with a dilemma. How do we act in a religiously elevating manner, according to our own personal needs and views, without our approach causing resentment in the eyes of other sons of Hashem, who act or view things differently? *************************************************************************** P'ninat Mishpat Should Beit Din Hold up Payment When a Ruling is Questionable? (excerpts from Piskei Din Rabbani'im IX pp.226-241) Case: A husband obligated himself in alimony with a signed document. He now claims that the document is invalid for a number of reasons, including the fact that the obligation is open-ended, which, according to the Rambam, invalidates it. He demands that beit din suspend further payment, despite the document having been approved by another beit din. Ruling: There are a few factors that justify beit din not aiding the husband in his attempt to extricate himself from the obligation he accepted upon himself at the time of divorce. In a case (like this one) where a majority of opinions rule that the defendant has to pay but a reasonable minority disagree, we normally allow the defendant to say kim li, that he has confidence that the opinions that exempt him are correct. In such a case, we employ the rule that the one who possesses the money has the upper hand and is exempt. The question is what happens if beit din ruled, in such a case, that he has to pay. Can the defendant sue in another court to halt payments, or do we employ the concept of kam dina (the ruling stands), which gives validity to a ruling that might not have been made based on what we now know? A similar case arises in Sanhedrin 29b. R. Yishmael ruled that a certain, questionable admission was valid, but R. Chiya demonstrated some time later that his reasoning had apparently been faulty. R. Chiya instructed the defendant that the money he had paid based on R. Yishmael's ruling would remain in the hands of the plaintiff, but that he would not have to pay any more. If we follow the precedent just cited, it would seem that the defendant in our case would not have to pay more than he already did. However, there is room to distinguish in two possible ways. Firstly, it appears that R. Chiya, who made the second ruling, was convinced that the first ruling was a taut b'shikul hada'at (a mistake in analysis). But in our case, the second beit din agrees that most rishonim accept the obligation's validity, and only for lack of certainty would they not have forced the defendant to pay. However, that lack of certainty might not be enough to overturn the first court's decision. Secondly, the situation after the first ruling is such that the plaintiff no longer needs beit din's help in order to secure payment, as the document it authorized is useable to force payment through the civil authorities. It is possible that in such a case, even those sums of money that were not yet paid are considered as if they are in the plaintiff's possession (the ex-wife, in this case), and kim li would no longer forestall payment. The main factor, which brings us to decide not to intervene, is the fact that the obligation to pay was not really created by beit din, which would have brought up questions about the ruling's validity, when done against the rules of kim li. Rather, beit din just confirmed an agreement that the sides decided upon and brought to them for approval. In such a case, where it is likely that the obligation is valid, beit din should not get involved to prevent payment. *************************************************************************** Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l) Kilayim - IV - Are the Products of Mixed Sowing or Grafting Forbidden? (based on Eretz Hemdah II, 1:5; 2:3) The gemara (Chulin 115a) inquires whether the product of mixed sowing (kilei zeraim) is included in the concept that "all which I categorized for you as an abomination is forbidden" (based on Devarim 14:3). The first stage in rejecting that proposition is to show that the animal born from cross-breeding (kilei beheima) is permitted, as is clear from the need for a special prohibition on such an animal in regard to sacrificing it. Based on the Torah's connection between kilei zeraim and kilei beheima, the gemara derives that the crops grown from kilei zeraim are permitted, as well. The Rambam (Kilayim 1:7) extends this permission to eat the product of kilei zeraim to the fruit of kilei harkava (grafting). The Beit Yosef (Yoreh Deah 295) explains that grafting is also included in the general category of kilei zeraim, which the aforementioned gemara and the pasuk that it refers to, discuss. It is forbidden not only to plant or graft in the proscribed manner, but it is also forbidden to allow their growth to continue in that way. However, one may take a branch or seed from a grafted tree and plant it (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 295:7). This is because one is no longer combining two different species, but using an existing (albeit, new) species. Even the person who acted improperly and grafted may go and use the fruit or plant its seed in order to create a new tree. The Chazon Ish (Yoreh Deah 178:11) raises the possibility of the following distinction. The shoot from a grafted tree is already grafted and is a new entity, and, as such, can be planted. However, the tree as a whole is itself still made up of two species. So, if one would uproot it and want to replant it, it would be like planting two species together and would be included in the prohibition of grafting. This idea does not have a source in the gemara. It also does not seem to make sense. After all, even after the tree is uprooted from the ground, the two elements of the tree are still inter-grown and form a new interbred species, which is permitted to re-plant, no differently from its seeds. The concept of a prohibition to eat or receive benefit from kilayim does exist. However, that is only in regard to kilei hakerem, which results when grains are planted together in the proximity of a vineyard. There the Torah says "pen tukdash," from which Chazal derived, "lest it become an object which needs to be consumed in fire." This categoriztion is a hint that we are dealing with a product that cannot be used for eating or other benefits (Kiddushin 9b). *************************************************************************** Ask the Rabbi There are areas where, if one does not repeat something every three years, it can be claimed that he does not stand by his original statement (Bava Batra 39b). We, therefore, felt it time to repeat our opinion on reading Hemdat Yamim during davening (from Parashat Bo, 5761). Question: You and others publish parasha sheets, which are distributed in shul. You are probably aware that people read these at various times during davening. Is this proper? Answers: Reading divrei Torah (to which we will limit this answer) during davening raises several issues: 1) hefseik - an interruption in the midst of a mitzva or text where it is improper; 2) lack of concentration on the matter that one should be involved with; 3) creating a negative atmosphere or precedent, which may be copied improperly; 4) derech eretz. Let's now analyze each issue. 1) Interruption - One may not speak even divrei Torah in the following places: a) Psukei D'zimra (Shulchan Aruch, OC 51:4); b) Kri'at Shma and its berachot- (Rama, OC 68:1); c) Shmoneh Esrei (see Orach Chayim, siman 104). However, according to most poskim, thinking or even reading is not considered a formal interruption. This is based on the rule "hirhur lav k'dibur" (thinking is not like speaking) - see Berachot 20b; Rama OC 68:1; Har Tzvi, OC 42. While it is proper to concentrate on tefilla during tefilla, reading is not a formal interruption (see a fascinating story about the Vilna Gaon, cited in Yabia Omer IV, OC, 8). 2,3) Lack of concentration, atmosphere - In the midst of Kri'at Hatorah (Shulchan Aruch 146:2; Biur Halacha, ad loc.), Kaddish, Kedusha, Shmoneh Esrei ... one should not be thinking about other things. Regarding Chazarat Hashatz (repetition of Shmoneh Esrei), Magen Avraham 124:8 brings two opinions as to whether it is permissible for one who will be careful to answer "amen" properly to learn. The Mishna Berura (124:17) prefers the strict opinion, out of fear that others will learn to abuse the leniency. Igrot Moshe (OC IV, 19) points out that there need to be at least nine people who are listening to every word in order to entertain such a leniency. In between aliyot one is permitted to learn, while being careful to stop as the next aliya begins (see Mishna Berura 146:6). Before the beginning of Chazarat Hashatz, most poskim permit silent learning. 4) As derech eretz kadma la'torah, it is improper to read during the d'var Torah of the rabbi or a fellow congregant. In summary, while parasha sheets are sometimes read at times when it is forbidden or questionable, they seem to have replaced a lot of talking and less holy thoughts in many of our shuls. Therefore, on the whole, they seem to have added more to the spirituality of our batei knesset than they have detracted. ("Hemdat Yamim" oto karata - at the right time). 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