Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Toldot 5764

Hemdat Yamim Parshat Toldot 4 Kislev 5764 *********************************************** This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to the memory of R' Meir ben Yechezkel Shraga Brachfeld o.b.m., Yitzchak Eliezer Ben Avraham Mordechai Jacobson o.b.m and Yehudit bat HaRav Shmuel Shlomo Carrey o.b.m. **************************************************************************** ** Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbis to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship combined with community service, ensures that its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations resulting in an exceptionally strong connection to Jewish communities worldwide. **************************************************************************** ****************************************** The Price of a Corruption of the Truth Yaakov said what he said and did what he did and, as a result, received the blessing that his father had planned to give to his older brother. He was extremely reluctant to carry out the plan of deception that his mother devised for him and may even have hoped to get caught rather than deceive his father (see Makkot 24a). His reluctance stemmed from the fact that his whole personality and life mission was based on emmet (truth) (Yalkut Shimoni, Sh'lach 743). The prophecy that prompted his mother to command him to get the blessing made his uncharacteristic behavior necessary. Reluctantly or not, Yaakov did deceive his father, a negative act in and of itself, as Yitzchak (Bereishit 27: 35) and the navi (see Yirmiyah 9:3) imply. Let us take a short but crucial digression. Some of us teach our children (or they are taught in school) that Yaakov did not lie, based on the linguistic pilpul that Rashi (27:9) brings. Halachically, what Yaakov did would be forbidden under normal circumstances (see Shvuot 31a on "mid'var sheker tirchak" and many other sources). All Rashi means is that even when forced to do something which would otherwise be a sin, Yaakov tried to do so in a manner that would minimize the necessary abuse. Teaching that there was nothing inherently objectionable in Yaakov's methods only justifies children's (and adults') tendency to bend the truth (=lie) as convenient or profitable. A look at society (even religious society) shows how dangerous an educational mistake it is to encourage this misconception. Let us return. Trickery, which was the negative element of Yaakov's deed, seems to have afflicted Yaakov throughout his life. Lavan and Leah tricked him into marrying Leah before Rachel. (Midrash Tanchuma, Vayeitzei 11 stresses that when Yaakov confronted Leah over her deception, she responded that Yaakov himself had acted similarly to his father). Lavan lied to him about the form of his payment after years of dedicated service. Yaakov's own sons lied to him for 22 years regarding the fate of the abducted Yosef. Certainly, then, it would seem that Yaakov was being punished for the sin of lying. Were these painful episodes in Yaakov's life punishments? No. Yaakov's marriage to Leah paved the way for the Jewish people (named for Leah's son, Judah) to come into being. As a result of Lavan's lies, Yaakov ended up with a much bigger flock than he originally requested. The circumstances of Yosef's abduction paved the way for the saving of Yaakov's family from famine and the exile in Egypt, which was necessary for their emergence as a nation. Was Yaakov, then, happy with all of these episodes in his life? Not really. Yaakov paid a tremendous personal price in the form of psychological torment. The payoffs were long-term, historical ones, which shaped our nation. Indeed, Yaakov had to make the initial decision whether or not to heed his mother's demands of him. In doing so, he had to choose between the welfare of Yaakov, the pure man who sat in the tents of Torah, and Yaakov/Yisrael, the forefather, whose boldness was necessary to forge the way for his descendants' nation. Yaakov, the man, was ready to and did pay the price, so that Bnei Yisrael could flourish, albeit, not without struggles and difficulties of our own. **************************************************************************** ***************************************** P'ninat Mishpat - Returning Lost Objects- VI- Pay for Returning Object Upon returning the lost item (aveida) there are different types of monetary claims that the finder can make on the owner. He can demand reimbursement for direct expenditures related to tending to the aveida, most classically when the aveida is an animal which needs to be fed (Bava Metzia 28b). But can he charge for the trouble he went through to find the owner? The gemara (Berachot 29a) learns that one may not take money for performing mitzvot, just as Moshe did not charge Bnei Yisrael for teaching them Torah. While we haven't the space to develop the idea, the basic explanation seems to be as follows (by mitzvot other than teaching Torah, which is more severe). Whenever one demands payment for a service, he is in effect "threatening" the person interested in the service that unless he is promised payment, he will refuse to provide the service. However, when the service is an obligatory mitzva (such as returning a lost object) he cannot honestly say that he will refuse to return it. (According to this appproach, one who does the mitzva may receive money if it is offered to him voluntarily.) Yet, in at least one case, he can demand some payment for his time. In a case where he lost out from his normal livelihood to perform the mitzva, he can demand that which is known as s'char batala (compensation for being idle from work) (ibid.30b). This is simply an extension of the concept that one can demand compensation for expenditures. Even in this case, steps are taken to determine the true, monetary loss incurred while returning the aveida. If the activity of returning the aveida is less strenuous than the work it replaced, then we subtract the value of the relative "vacation from work" that the finder enjoyed from the s'char batala otherwise coming to the finder. Only when the finder resents the cost of the "vacation time" forced upon him by the mitzva of hashavat aveida can special arrangements be made to compensate him fully (ibid.) **************************************************************************** *************************************** Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l( Marriage Between People From Families with Occurrences of a Serious Disease- Part II ]We continue our discussion about a prospective couple, each of whom coming from a family with two occurrences of a certain, serious disease. We saw a possible distinction to answer an apparent contradiction in the Shulchan Aruch. Two occurrences are enough to indicate a representative trend (chazaka) in the case of a mother or two sisters who gave birth to flawed babies. For more distant relatives, three time are needed]. We must try to understand the compromise position that chazaka requires only two occurrences but by second-degree relatives three times are required . One can accept or deny the connection of illness between different members of an extended family. But if one accepts it, why should the number that creates a chazaka change? The Chatam Sofer (Shut, VI, 70) brings an interesting source for this basic distinction. The gemara (Chulin 95b) interprets Yaakov Avinu's statement of fear that some tragedy might befall Binyamin as follows. As Yosef and Shimon were gone, if something would happen to Binyamin, then there will be a chazaka that would bode danger for all of his sons. Thus, by siblings, chazaka is established after three times. In contrast, Yehuda deemed Tamar to be a dangerous wife after only two husbands died. That is because Tamar's trend was directly related to one person, whereas Binyamin was just the third member of a family. This source, though, is of little help for us, as we are working with the assumption that siblings should be treated like the person himself, not like the broader family. In general, we need to understand what it means that two occurrences create a possible chazaka [see last week's installment]. The gemara (Bava Metzia 106b) seems to treat two occurrences as a full chazaka. The logic seems to be as follows. When an unusual occurrence happens, we assume that normalcy prevails and that the occurrence was chance, namely, that it was caused by some external factor. We may assume that there is no reason to expect that the external factor will cause a recurrence. When the matter arises again, there is a chazaka of sorts. We are now convinced that there is an internal factor which is connected to the phenomenon. However, we have reason to suspect that the occurrences happen only when another factor(s) joins in, and there is not enough evidence to expect that the combination of factors will recur. Since we are not sure if one factor is responsible for the occurrences, which would cause us more concern, or a combination of factors, we treat the situation as a safek (halachic doubt). Thus, we are cautious in cases where we fear for someone's life but also cautious before extracting money based on doubt. Only after three times do we assume that the cause of the occurrence is directly entrenched in the subject and that the phenonenom is likely to reappear without the need for other contributing factors. [We now have the basis to complete our discussion next week]. **************************************************************************** ****************************************** Ask the Rabbi Question: I often am asked to go to a significantly later minyan than I like in order to ensure a minyan in a house of mourning. On those days, I do not have time for breakfast between davening and work. To further complicate matters, in the morning, I have to take medicines that cannot be eaten on an empty stomach. May I have breakfast before davening under these circumstances? Answer: The gemara (Berachot 10b) brings two p'sukim as the basis for the prohibition on eating before Shacharit. While the first one seems to indicate an objective problem, Chazal interpret the second in a manner that implies that it is an act of haughtiness to involve oneself in eating before addressing Hashem, his Creator and King. The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 89) understands that the prohibition is rabbinic and the p'sukim are only an asmachta (an informal basis within Tanach for a rabbinic law). He explains that Chazal formulated the derivation in a way that would imply that they forbade eating only when it, subjectively, displays haughtiness. What are some examples where eating before Shacharit is permitted under these guidelines? The Avi Haezri (cited by Rosh, Berachot 1:10 and accepted by Shulchan Aruch (OC 89:3)) says that drinking water is not indulging enough to be considered haughty. Mahari Abuhav (accepted by Shulchan Aruch, ibid.) says that, by the same logic, one can eat foods whose purpose is medicinal. The Biur Halacha (ad loc.), based on the Pri Chadash and Pri Megadim, says that in a medicinal context, it is permitted to eat even if one is capable of waiting until after Shacharit. Another scenario is where one is too thirsty or hungry to daven with proper concentration. According to the strict letter of the law, one should not pray in such a state of mind (Rambam, Tefilla 5:2). Even though we are resigned to sufficing with a lower than proper level of concentration, one has the right to eat or drink as necessary to enable better concentration (Beit Yosef, ibid.). The Pri Megadim (Eshel Avraham 89:13) says that this too is not considered an act of haughtiness and was never included in the prohibition. The question, in your case, is whether eating which is not medicinal, but is preparatory for taking medicine, is permitted before Shacharit? The Pri Chadash (89: 4) is bothered by the need for special permission given to one who is thirsty to drink before davening. After all, one can drink water even if he is not particularly thirsty. He re-reads the Shulchan Aruch to say that if one is thirsty but considers it unhealthy to drink water on an empty stomach, he can even eat to enable him to drink. So we see that any eating which is necessary to enable an activity which halacha deems important before davening (including taking medicine) is permitted. The Biur Halacha (ibid.) suggests that before eating, one should at least say Kriat Shma (first paragraph), which needs to be preceded by Birchot Hatorah. Others add a suggestion to say a prayer that contains an element of supplication and/or Birchot Hashachar. Since these anyway need to be said before P'sukei D'zimra, it is not a big deal to say them a little earlier, before eating. The only limitation is that the poskim are strict about extending these leniencies beyond the necessary minimum. (See, for example, the Mishna Berura (89: 21) regarding what one who needs to drink tea in order to concentrate can put into it and many other sources.) Thus, while you are permitted to eat the amount necessary to prevent the medicine from having a detrimental effect on your health (consult your doctor), that would not permit you to take the opportunity to have a full breakfast at that time. It is wonderful that you are willing to arrange your schedule in order to accommodate mourners. We hope you can find a way to start the morning with the nutrition and calm needed to get a good start, but without compromising the primacy of tefilla as the beginning of one's activities. We assume that, with further planning and continued dedication to doing things right, you can work out the situation in the best possible way. 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