Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Vaetchanan 5763

Hemdat Yamim Vaetchanan - 11 Av 5763 ************************************************ This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to the memory of R' Meir ben Yechezkel Shraga Brachfeld o.b.m. *************************************************************************** Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbis to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship combined with community service, ensures that its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations resulting in an exceptionally strong connection to Jewish communities worldwide. ******************************************************************************************************************* Idols Where There Should be Ideals Harav Moshe Ehrenreich The first of the Ten Commandments requires us to accept Hashem as our G-d, without having any other form of deity. Yet, the Torah continues with another commandment, not to make for ourselves any molten image. It appears from the p'sukim that it is possible for one to have complete faith in Hashem and not worship another god, yet he could still be susceptible to having images of deities. What is the deeper meaning of this second commandment? The Torah warns us, in our parasha (Devarim 4:23): "Beware lest you forget the covenant with Hashem ... and you will make an idol, the image of anything, that Hashem commanded you." Rashi explains the end of the pasuk to mean "that Hashem commanded you [not to have]," but the pasuk's literal reading implies that there is a type of idol that Hashem actually commanded. It is brought in the name of the Rebbe of Kutzk that there is a danger that one could take something that Hashem commanded, in other words, a mitzva, and turn the mitzva into an idol. For there are times that a person performs a mitzva, but does so in a hollow form, without the mitzva's soul and spirit, thus making it like a lifeless idol, which is nothing but an image. A striking example of such an external and meaningless approach to a mitzva can be found in the shocking story related by the gemara (Yoma 23a). The story occurred before the destruction of the second Beit Hamikdash. Two kohanim were racing up the ramp to the altar. One stabbed the other in the heart, mortally wounding him. As people were crying, the father of the victim ran to his son and removed the knife. He called out that he had managed to remove the knife before his son died, thereby saving the knife from tumat meit (impurity from contact with the dead). The gemara concludes that we see that the purity of utensils was more significant to some people than murder. The stones of the altar cannot be fashioned with the help of metal, because that which is reminiscent of the sword is inappropriate to be involved with the holiness of the altar. Similarly, King David was not allowed to construct the Beit Hamikdash because of his involvement in war. In the Holy of Holies, the set of keruvim, serve as symbols of brotherhood and peace, a theme that King Shlomo prayed for on a universal basis, at the Beit Hamikdash's inauguration. So when a kohen is so "diligent" that he kills his closest competitor to reach the altar first, the diligence is not to the ideal behind service of Hashem, but to an empty, idolatrous form of the practice. The father's response, in the story, also shows a warped view of mitzvot. The laws of purity and impurity should imbue in us the value of life. For indeed, the highest form of impurity comes from the remains of a body, which once housed human life and is now lacking. Impurity in animals does not exist while the animal is still alive. In the period of the Second Temple, people were careful about the laws of purity, but it was the idol-like image of the mitzva that they observed, not the ideal behind it. Thus, the stricken father was consoled that the knife was pure, barely noticing the tragedy of his murder. In our times as well, we must be aware that, although the inclination toward classical idol worship was "slaughtered," the commandment to avoid forming idols is still very relevant. It should remind us to think about the heart and soul of the mitzvot, not their "outer shell." *************************************************************************************************************************** P'ninat Mishpat - A Divorced Parent Removing a Child from Israel (based on Piskei Din Rabbani'im (pp. 173-178) Case: A mother agreed, during a divorce settlement that the father would have custody of their small child (presently, two and a half years old), and he agreed to limited visitation rights for her. After a year, the father decided to travel abroad for six months to his parents to recuperate from the emotional strain of divorce. The mother petitioned the court to prevent the father from removing the child from Israel, stating that it would detract from her visitation rights and that she had reason to believe that the father would never return with the child. She demanded that if the father wanted to travel, the child should be given over to her custody during that period. Majority opinion: The mother may indeed demand that the child not be removed permanently from Eretz Yisrael. While the rule about one member of the family forcing another to move to Eretz Yisrael and not to leave is found in regard to spouses (Ketubot 110b), Rashi seems to expand it to the household in general. A mother can not actually force her husband to give over a child in his custody to move to Israel, as the forcing to move to Israel goes only as far as being grounds to divorce when the spouse refuses. However, it seems that her claim would at least prevent him from changing the status quo by making the child leave. That being said, here the father claims that he is taking the child out of Eretz Yisrael only temporarily, and the aforementioned sources refer to the question of permanent living arrangements. While it is a halachic problem to leave Eretz Yisrael even temporarily, it is permitted according to most authorities for a variety of mitzvot and clear needs. The father's desire to visit his parents and recuperate emotionally is legitimate, and, thus, the issue of leaving Eretz Yisrael should not be an impediment to the visit. We do not see grounds to doubt the father's stated intention to return within a matter of months, but as the mother claims otherwise, we will require the father to make appropriate financial guarantees. We must also deal with visitation rights. The main concern in these matters is that of the child's welfare. While it is important that the child maintain the relationship with his mother, that relationship need not be severed by a temporary separation. To the contrary, based on mutual agreement, the father is the primary caregiver for the child. The prospect of the young child being uprooted from his father's custody for a matter of months after having become accustomed to his care, becoming accustomed to different surroundings, and being subsequently returned to the father is more traumatic. Visitation rights are important and must be followed, but they should not prevent the normal course of life, which may include one parent not seeing the child for a matter of months. Again, as the child's emotional state will be more affected by leaving the parent with whom he is now more comfortable, he should accompany his father on a visit which is deemed to be a necessary one. *************************************************************************************************************************** Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l) Double Consolation - (condensed from Shvilin, Tishrei 5723) R. Akiva convinced R. Yehoshua that R. Gamliel had the religious authority to set the beginning of the month (and, as a result, the occurrence of Yom Kippur) even if it was an objective mistake. R. Yehoshua's reaction was recorded as follows: "He said to him in the following wording, 'Akiva, you have consoled me, you have consoled me.'" (Rosh Hashana 25a). When R. Akiva explained to his colleagues that the devastation they saw at the sight of the destroyed Beit Hamikdash was actually an omen to its eventual restoration, the gemara relates their reaction as follows. "They said to him in the following wording, 'Akiva, you have consoled us, Akiva, you have consoled us'" (Makkot 24b). The introduction to their reaction ("... in the following wording") indicates that the phraseology is important, and, therefore, we must take note of the double language that they employed. Eicha Rabba notes: "They sinned doubly ... were punished doubly ...and will be consoled doubly, as it says, 'Be consoled, be consoled, my nation.'" We see the phenomenon of double in terms of sin, punishment, and, once again, consolation. What does it mean? The Kuzari writes: "Yisrael among the nations is like the heart among the limbs of the body" (2:36). One can compare the relationship to that of concentric circles, in which the inner circles affect the more distant ones. If something is off in the inner circle by even a little, it will magnify the problem in the outer ones. For example, if the trajectory of a missile is off by even centimeters at its point of launching, it can cause its landing to be off by thousands of miles. Therefore, Hashem is exacting with his tzadikim like the thread of a hair, because the little that a great tzadik is lacking can have a horrible, ripple effect on those who are more on the periphery. When Bnei Yisrael are lacking, it reflects itself not only in their spiritual state and the treatment they deserve from Hashem. Rather, when the "heart" does not effectively spread the blood throughout the body, the limbs begin to malfunction, as well. The nations are likely to become more immoral and brutal in their treatment of us, as their dedication to such obligations as not to kill are further compromised by the atmosphere of spiritual deficiency that Bnei Yisrael's sins create. Thus, Bnei Yisrael's sin is double, causing their own deterioration and that of the nations. Similarly, their affliction is double. They deserve Divine retribution and are exposed to enemies whose ruthlessness exceeds its normal levels. However, the consolation is double, as Bnei Yisrael will always remain the heart of the nations. As they are purified from iniquity, the rest of the world will be elevated and will live in an atmosphere of "no nation will hold up the sword against another." The world will be unified in service of Hashem, and will benefit from a religiously symbiotic relationship. We can also understand the doubling of R. Akiva's consolations. When R. Akiva saw the desolation, which was so poignant specifically by what was the most holy of all places, he realized and taught that it was the still the most sensitive place, as the place of the Temple was still the center of the circle. It was a sign that it would, in the future, serve as the center of the circle in terms of positive effect. So too, R. Akiva taught R. Yehoshua that the judicial center of Bnei Yisrael has the power to determine the cosmic question of when the new month begins. If their leaders had such power even when not within the Temple, then certainly the entire nation was the center of the circle. This realization is conveyed to future generations by the deliberate use of the double language of consolation. *************************************************************************************************************************** Ask the Rabbi Question: Someone promised to make a donation to a school, but he has not yet fulfilled his promise? Can this be enforced? Can I cite retribution if he does not agree to keep his promise? Answer: Before we get into the particulars of the case, we should note that a Jew should always take great care to keep his word in monetary matters, as well as other matters (see Bava Metzia 49a). However, the demands that a person should make on himself and the ones others can enforce over him are two separate things. In general there is a concept that beit din can force someone to fulfill his tzedaka obligations properly (Shulchan Aruch 248:1). The classic case is where one did not make a pledge, but that the authorities in charge of tzedaka assessed that he should be giving a certain amount. Most poskim seem to assume that the same is true if one made a specific pledge to give tzedaka even if it is beyond his minimum requirement (see Tzedaka U'mishpat 1:(31)), as one's pledges are called nidrei (oaths of) tzedaka and are binding like oaths. But one should understand what we are talking about. This coercion is not the right of a specific expected recipient to enforce that which is his by right. Rather it is the authority of beit din to see to it that people are fulfilling the mitzvot they should. We are not in the practice, to say the least, of forcing someone to put on tefillin or sit in the sukka, and such attempts, in our context, are usually counterproductive. For one to all of a sudden suggest that we should be aggressive with one who does not fulfill his obligation specifically in a given case is questionable from a few perspectives. It is possibly even counterproductive for the overall welfare of the institution that is awaiting payment. But we should investigate if there is ever a situation where the rights of the recipient become monetary, giving them an absolute right to sue for payment, whether or not it is within the overall best interests of the donor, the community or themselves. There is a concept in regard to donations to hekdesh (property of the Beit Hamikdash) that one's word given to hekdesh is like handing over to a person. The Rashba (Shut I, 563) rules that such promises to charity are not binding without an act of acquisition. Similarly, the Rama (Choshen Mishpat 252:2) rules: "One who makes an oath to give a certain amount to a certain person and dies without giving, his inheritors are exempt from paying" (The implication is that this ruling applies to cases where the intended recipient was poor). On the other hand, the Rama (ibid. 212:7) says that if one makes a pledge to give the fruits of a tree to charity, and he is still alive when the fruit grows, he is obligated based on the laws of oaths to give them. The Netivot Hamishpat (250:4) makes the following distinction, which can reconcile the two rulings. If the donation is general, relating to a sum of money, then it doesn't take hold until it is given. In contrast, if the donation is related to a specific item, then the obligation takes hold on the object. It sounds that, in this case, the donation was to be a sum of money, which does not take hold. There are other factors that could possibly exempt the pledger. The pledge is considered like an oath, classically, when it is to the poor. Here it is to a school, and it is not automatic that that is considered outright charity. While supporting Torah institutions is certainly a mitzva and a proper use of tzedaka funds (Shulchan Aruch, YD 249:15) the donor might claim that his money was not directed to enable Torah studies but was to be used for other purposes. (Some side expenses are necessary for Torah study even if they seem ancillary (see Pitchei Teshuva YD 259:5), but not all are.) If the pledger's financial situation deteriorated drastically, he may have the right to make hatarat nedarim (Aruch Hashulchan, YD 258:17). There might be other claims (see some in Tzedaka U'mishpat, ch.4). While it is (very) possible that no valid excuse exists, it is not our place to make such a judgment without considering his explanations. The way to go is to seek a way to work out the matter without threats of any sort. Harav Shaul Israeli zt"l Founder and President Deans: Harav Yosef Carmel Harav Moshe Ehrenreich ERETZ HEMDAH 5 Ha-Mem Gimmel St. P.O.B 36236 Jerusalem 91360 Tel/Fax: 972-2-5371485 Email: eretzhem@netvision.net.il web-site: www.eretzhemdah.org American Friends of Eretz Hemdah Institutions c/o Olympian 8 South Michigan Ave. Suite 605 Chicago, IL 60603 USA Our Taxpayer ID#: 36-4265359

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