Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat vayakhel 5763

Hemdat Yamim Parshat Vayakhel 27 Adar I 5763 ============================== This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to the memory of R' Meir ben Yechezkel Shraga Brachfeld o.b.m. ===================================== Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbis to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship combined with community service, ensures that its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations resulting in an exceptionally strong connection to Jewish communities worldwide. ============================================== How Many Keruvim was Moshe to Make? / Harav Yosef Carmel Last week we brought the opinion of the Talmidei Ha'gra and the Meshech Chuchma that one can explain the differences between the command to build the mishkan and its implementation in the following manner. After the giving of the Torah and before chet ha'egel (sin of the Golden Calf), Bnei Yisrael were on a very high level, comparable to that of Adam before his sin. The chet ha'egel had a similar impact to that of Adam's sin of the eitz hada'at. This week we will take a look at another consequence of the spiritual deterioration, which finds expression in the building of the mishkan. In the Holy of Holies of the mishkan stood keruvim (angel-like forms), which were connected to the kaporet on top of the aron. In the beit hamikdash, Shlomo added another set of keruvim. These keruvim stood on the floor, were made of shitim wood, coated with gold, and were much larger than Moshe's keruvim. Another difference is that Moshe's keruvim faced each other, while Shlomo's faced out. The obvious question is how Shlomo could allow himself to add on extra keruvim, which Moshe was apparently not commanded to construct? The Meshech Chuchma contends that Moshe was indeed commanded in Parashat Terumah to make two sets of keruvim but that this was not carried out because of the effects of chet ha'egel. One can find a hint in the p'sukim for this contention. In the description of the command, it says: "You shall make two keruvim... from the two edges of the kaporet" (Shemot 25:18). It continues: "Make one keruv from this edge and one keruv from that edge" (ibid.:19). In repeating the details of the actual construction, the word "they made" appears only once in this context. This missing "they made" may be a hint that there was something related that did not actually get made. This idea that the lessening of the dwelling of the shechina brings on a negative effect to the keruvim is found in Chazal in a similar context. In the ma'aseh hamerkava (description of the Divine chariot) in Sefer Yeshaya (6:2), each saraph (which is parallel to the keruvim) has six wings. In the description in Yechezkel (1:6), at the time of exile, only four wings remain. The process of the withdrawal of the shechina and the increased influence of the chet ha'egel are that which caused the decrease in the number of the wings. =============================================== P'ninat Mishpat -Distancing Damages- Part X- Zoning Regulations and Overcrowding Is there a halachic source for zoning laws that prevent turning a single family house into a multi-family house? The mishna (Bava Batra 59b) forbids one building an attic for his house and creating an entrance to it from the joint courtyard of the neighbors without their permission. The gemara (ibid. 60a) explains that it is because it can cause overcrowding in the courtyard. The Rambam, after bringing this halacha, writes (Sh'cheinim 5:9): "From here we learn that if one of the partners brought to his house people from another household, his friend can prevent him, because he causes overcrowding." Thus, we seem to have a precedent for zoning laws, which can impinge upon even what one does within his own house. The Ra'avad (ad loc.) takes issue on the Rambam and says that as long as one doesn't make new entrances from the joint area, there should be no way for one to prevent a neighbor from having as many guests as he likes. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 154:2) paskens basically like the Rambam, and the Rama (ad loc.) paskens basically like the Ra'avad. The Shulchan Aruch, based on the Magid Mishneh, understands that the Rambam agrees that one can have as many guests as he likes, as long as they fit into his family unit. He just cannot have entire families living separately under his roof. The Rama agrees that it is problematic to extend physically onto the house in order to make room for another family. There is logic and basis to distinguish between cases when he brings others into his house out of altruism and when he does so in order to receive rent (see Aruch Hashulchan CM 154:1; Mishkan Shalom10:(31)). =============================================== Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l) Compromises in Religious Legislation- part II (from Amud Hay'mini, siman 11) [We discussed last time the question of agreeing to legislation which is positive for the spiritual welfare of most but is directly harmful to that of others, where the alternative is a worse situation for all. We cited the mishna that if attackers say they will defile a group of women if the group does not hand over one of them, they should not give one over. On the other hand, there is an opinion in the Yerushalmi that if they specify a woman whom they demand, then it is better to give her over than to have the same tragedy befall them all. The problem is that the Rambam paskens like the opinion that in the parallel case of handing over someone to be killed, one can do so only if the specified person is guilty of death.] We must understand what it means that the selected person is guilty of death. If it means that he is truly guilty, then why is it that he can be given over only to save lives? After all, non-Jewish authorities have the right to punish those who deserve it. If one learns the Yerushalmi carefully [we cannot in this forum], he sees that the person was judged for death improperly, and yet he can be given over. But what is the logic of Reish Lakish that he must been sentenced for death, if the sentencing isn't legitimate? The idea is along the lines that at a time of decrees against c'lal Yisrael, one has to give his life to uphold even minor customs (Sanhedrin 74b). Rashi explains the logic that we cannot allow the oppressors to get used to weakening the Jews' resolve, causing them to collapse in more serious matters, as well. Reish Lakish felt the same is so when the oppressors try to cause social strife by forcing a group to hand over one of their own to be murdered. When each one tries to save his own life at the expense of others, the enemy can have their way and inflict greater damage. This is so even when one has been selected by the idol worshippers. However, when the specified person was selected because, according to their (mistaken) system of justice, that person deserved to be killed, the logic does not apply. In that case, his situation was unique within the group, and the idol worshippers were not trying to weaken the group, but to do what they believed was right. R. Yochanan, who did not require the specified person to be guilty by any standard, agreed to the concept that we cannot allow a situation where one Jew is pitted against another. He just reasoned that as long as Jews do not have to decide whom to give over, the fear of internal fighting does not apply. According to the above analysis, the machloket between R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish applies only to the question of murder and not to that of defilement. If they choose one person to be killed without any apparent logic, then we must fear it is to weaken the whole group. However, regarding the defilement, they choose one in whom they are interested specifically. Although effort should be made to save her, there is no point in having all of them killed or defiled in order to do so. ============================================ Ask the Rabbi Question: If you give someone a present in the form of a donation to charity in his name, can it be taken from ma'aser money? Answer: This is a fascinating question that we have not found explicitly in halachic literature. There is a related concept that one cannot use an animal that was already set aside for a sacrifice in order to fulfill an obligatory sacrifice (Chagiga 7b). In other words, at times one cannot kill two birds with one stone. However, that is not a halachic source for your case. So let's analyze the case logically from a halachic perspective. The money you give to charity in someone's name can count toward ma'aser, if you like. The problem is that then, you're not really giving your friend a present. The idea of giving a gift in the form of a donation in the recipient's name/honor is to say as follows: "I know that you care more for the needy than you do about a new tie. So the money that would have gone for the tie, I'll use for the poor, and it's as if you gave the donation." But over here, that isn't happening, but the following. The money, which anyway had to go to charity and could not be used for a friend's tie, is going to the same place it would have if your friend didn't have an occasion. So, in effect, one who uses ma'aser money for a present is unknowingly withholding a present and deceiving his friend. There maybe room for leniency in the following cases. 1) A person cannot afford to give ma'aser and is, thus, exempt from that rate of tzedaka, but he really wants to give as much as possible to the needy. So he accepts upon himself the praiseworthy practice of giving ma'aser, but he makes a condition that it will include presents. In this case, one could argue that he is not fully deceiving his friends, because more money does go to charity because of their altruism in accepting the donation instead of a gift. This is because the alternative is that he legitimately would not have accepted the practice of ma'aser. 2) If one picks the recipient of the charity to fit his friend's preferences, then, in effect, he is giving a gift to his friend, namely, tovat hana'ah. Tovat hana'ah is the indirect benefit that one receives by giving a donation. For example, a donor may get special treatment and even specific favors from the recipient. The donor can benefit from the good feeling of knowing that people he cares about are being provided for, and it is fully legitimate for the recipient to be a friend or relative. A receipt that enables a tax break is certainly tovat hana'ah. Although tovat hana'ah is actually worth money, we don't say that its estimated value should be reduced from the sum of tzedaka he is considered as having given. If one chooses a charity that he would not have given to, because he knows it is beloved to his friend, then he is giving a gift of tovat hana'ah. However, the actual present is not the face value of the donation, but its relative tovat hana'ah. ========================================= Hemdat Yamim is published weekly in conjunction with Gemara Berura. Harav Shaul Israeli zt"l Founder and President Deans: Harav Yosef Carmel Harav Moshe Ehrenreich 5 Ha-Mem Gimmel St. P.O.B 36236 Jerusalem 91360 ERETZ HEMDAH Tel/Fax: 972-2-5371485 Email: eretzhem@netvision.net.il web-site: www.eretzhemdah.org American Friends of Eretz Hemdah Institutions c/o Olympian 8 South Michigan Ave. Suite 605 Chicago, IL 60603 USA Our Taxpayer ID#: 36-4265359

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