Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Vaykhel pkudei 5764

Hemdat Yamim Parshat Vayakhel- Pekudei 27 Adar 5764 ***************************************************************** This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to the memory of R' Meir ben Yechezkel Shraga Brachfeld o.b.m., Yitzchak Eliezer Ben Avraham Mordechai Jacobson o.b.m. ************************************************************************************************ Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbis to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship combined with community service, ensures that its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations resulting in an exceptionally strong connection to Jewish communities worldwide. *************************************************************************************************************************** The Temporary Kohen Harav Yosef Carmel After all the preparations for the erection of the mishkan, the time came to actually erect it. We would have expected this holy task to belong to Aharon and his sons or the Levi'im, in general. Why does the Torah stress several times (see Shemot 40) that Moshe specifically was commanded to do so? What is even more puzzling is why Moshe, who was not a kohen, was also entrusted to bring the korbanot (sacrifices) at that time (ibid.:29). One could imagine that Moshe's involvement had to do with his exalted status as the holiest man and the greatest prophet in the history of the Jewish people. However, as we search Tanach for parallel examples, we find that it was Moshe's other role, as the king/ruler of Bnei Yisrael that was apparently responsible for his involvement. For indeed we find that in later consecrations of later sanctuaries, the kings are involved in similar roles to that of Moshe. In Melachim (I, 6) it tells of Shlomo Hamelech bringing sacrifices and sanctifying the courtyard of the Beit Hamikdash. Let us look further in history, at the Beit Hamikdash which is still to be rebuilt. The navi Yechezkel (see 45:18-25) tells us that the nasi (king or equivalent national leader) will bring the korbanot when the Beit Hamikdash will be consecrated in the days to come. One more precedent in Tanach involves David Hamelech. When he escorted the aron (holy ark) to Yerushalayim, dancing before it, he was wearing an efod bad (an apron of linen), which sounds like the vestment of the kohen gadol. Why an efod? Apparently, bringing the aron to Yerushalayim, which would be its permanent place of rest during the period of the Beit Hamikdash, which was in the planning stage, had an element of the practical steps towards construction of the Beit Hamikdash. We explained last year that there is a clear distinction between the service in the Beit Hamikdash and its construction. The former can be done even when it involves desecrating Shabbat, while the latter cannot. During the period of building, the sanctity of the mikdash is not yet permanent. With a lack of permanence and the issues being of a temporary nature, the king, who is responsible for the nation's day-to-day operations, is the one who is in charge. After the building, when the sanctity is permanent, then the kohanim, who have the permanent role of tending to the service of the mikdash, are appropriate. Shabbat is also a permanent time of sanctity, from the time of the creation of the world and on. Only the permanent operation of the mikdash can supercede it. Construction of the mikdash, representing the temporary efforts towards kedusha, cannot be allowed to desecrate Shabbat. Let us pray for the speedy arrival of the time when the Kingdom of Israel will be involved in the building of the Beit Hamikdash and then give over its operation to the kohanim. ************************************************************************************************************************ P'ninat Mishpat – The Binding Nature of Coalition Agreements (condensed from Piskei Din Rabbaniim - vol. VI, pp. 166-173) Case: Two religious parties ran on a joint list for municipal elections. The first two spots on the list were from party A and the third spot from party B. However, an agreement was made that if the joint party would receive only two seats, that one of A's representatives would resign. Indeed, the #1 person on the joint list (=X) signed a letter stating that he would resign immediately if it was "his turn" to do so based on coalition agreements. The joint list ended up getting two seats, but X refused to resign his seat, because he said that it was not his turn to do so since the #2 (=Y) should resign. Y had never signed that he was willing to resign. In addition to several politically related claims, party A claimed that the agreement was invalid because no halachically binding kinyan was made and the nature of the agreement also did not lend itself to such a kinyan. [Ed. note- according to Hemdat Yamim's policies, we left out the name of the parties and the municipality and request that our readers not try to guess who is who. (You would probably guess wrong anyway.)] Ruling: We do not need to get into the specific claims and counter claims about the propriety of the different parties' behavior leading up to the elections in order to rule. The main halachic issue here is whether the agreement at hand, which lacked several elements of a halachic kinyan, is binding. Firstly, no ma'ase kinyan (act of formalizing an agreement) was done. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 231:27-28) rules that the members of a city or even a society of craftsman can make agreements that are binding on the whole group even if those agreements do not conform to the rules of kinyanim. No mention is made of a need to perform a ma'ase kinyan, just of an agreement. This approach, that agreements made by the public are binding by virtue of their public nature, has precedent in several primary sources, including the Teshuvot Harosh and the Mordechai. The question is whether this rule applies only in cases where a kinyan, if done, could work. In our case, one can argue that the agreement is about a future situation and that there is an element of asmachta (an agreement which at least one side does not believe will come to fruition). However, one can bring several sources [ed. note- deleted because of constraints of space] to show that public agreements can overcome all of these halachic shortcomings. The basic rationale is that things done by the public or their valid representative(s) have more power and that society can function properly only when such agreements are kept. Thus, the coalition agreement at hand is binding. As X is the one who indicated his agreement to resign to fulfill A's agreement, he is responsible to do as he said. ************************************************************************************************************************** Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l) Raising Sheep in Israel in Our Days- part II (from Amud Hay'mini, siman 23) [We saw last time that although there was a rabbinical institution not to raise beheimot dakot (thin animals, such as sheep and goats) in Eretz Yisrael, this institution went out of practice when Eretz Yisrael was desolate (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 409:40). Rav Tzvi P. Frank claimed, based on one understanding of the Yerushalmi, that such institutions, which were nullified based on a changed situation, do not get renewed when the original situation returns unless done explicitly.] Although Rav Frank's principle is true (and can also be proved from Ketubot 3b), we must see if it applies to our specific rabbinic institution not to raise sheep in Eretz Yisrael. Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer III, CM.7) asks on the Shulchan Aruch's ruling that the institution did not apply in his time based on the rule that in order to uproot a rabbinic law, one requires a rabbinical assembly which is at least as great as the one which instituted it, even if the law's original reasoning no longer applies. He brings an answer based on Teshuvot Harosh (2:8) that when the reasoning for the original institution was well known, the law ceases to exist when the reason no longer applies. However, it is difficult to apply the Rosh's rule and try to determine when a reason is well known and when it is not. In truth, upon analyzing the institution's original formulation, it seems unnecessary to say that it was ever cancelled. It was always permitted to raise sheep in Eretz Yisrael, as long as this was done in an area without significant, Jewish inhabitation. Thus, as settlements rose up or waned, the geographical boundaries of the institution were naturally adjusted accordingly. Therefore, the Shulchan Aruch's lenient ruling is not a sign of the undoing of the institution but of its natural application according to the "map" of his times. In fact, there never was even a specific institution for Eretz Yisrael but a rule that applied to any area of concentrated, Jewish, agricultural settlement (see Tosafot, Bava Kama 80a). This dependence on the present, actual situation in each time and place works both to extend the prohibition and to limit it geographically, as appropriate. The Shulchan Aruch's leniency is thus easy to understand. However, it should follow logically that nowadays, when we have merited, with Hashem's mercy, to have an abundance of Jewish, agricultural settlement in Eretz Yisrael, the institution should apply here. However, there is a different approach to justify leniency. The institution was not an objective one applying to Eretz Yisrael, but a practical one to curtail damages (see formulation of Rambam, Nizkei Mamone 5:1-2). Therefore, it seems clear that if the potential victims of damage relinquish their rights to the safeguards, it becomes permitted to raise the sheep. In our days, when the Jewish community as a whole (as opposed to isolated individuals) gets benefit from the raising of the sheep and where they are kept penned in by fences, it is permitted to raise the sheep. This is preferable for the community that we are trying to protect than to require the expensive practice of importing meat from distant places. Under the circumstances of general agreement, no rabbinical lifting of the institution is necessary. *************************************************************************************************************************** Ask the Rabbi Question: My car got a deep scratch in the door when it was parked. The offender drove on without leaving a note. Because it was expensive to fix, we decided to leave it. Some time later, a similar damage occurred, but this time, the damager left a note and is willing to pay to have it fixed, if he is obligated. Once the door is removed to be fixed, there is little difference in price between fixing one scratch or two. Can I make the second person pay for damage which is significant in its own right but, given the fact that the door was already scratched, did not change very much? Answer: We want to commend you and the person who made the accident for wanting to do the right thing without regard to coming out monetarily ahead. May many follow in your footsteps (but drive more carefully than he). (The question ignores any involvement of insurance companies, and the answer follows suit.) There are two alternative approaches to compensating for causing damages that might be appropriate. One is to pay for the property's depreciation in value that was incurred as a result of the damage. The other is to see to it that the damage is rectified. At times, the former is more expensive and at times the latter is. The question of which of these the damager is responsible for is likely at the heart of a dispute between the Rambam and Ra'avad (Toein V'nitan 5:2), whether when one asks for payment for rectifiable damages to a field, the claim relates to money or to the field. The Shach (CM 95:18) and Chazon Ish (Bava Kama 6:3) imply that the Ra'avad (who seems to posit that the payment is for monetary loss, not to rectify the situation) agrees that when the normal course of action is to fix the damaged object, then the payment is geared to that need. Yet it appears that according to both approaches on the fundamental issue you are not entitled to demand full payment to fix the door. That is because the second damager is not responsible for previous damages you incurred but just for those that he did. Regarding depreciation of the car's (re-sale) value, there is probably little difference between a car with one scratch and a car with two scratches on the door. The possibility that the same, second scratch would have made a bigger difference in the price had it been the car's only blemish is not relevant. If one severely damages a luxury car and a second person subsequently "totals" it, the second person is responsible to pay only the value of a severely damaged car. From the perspective of paying to fix the car, you probably do not have a claim. The fact that you decided not to fix the door after the first scratch indicates that the damage is one that does not warrant fixing, given its relative cost and gain. In such a case, even the Rambam should agree one does not pay to have it fixed. Is it logical to require an exorbitant price to fix something of little value or improve it only slightly? Under two circumstances, you could demand the second damager to pay to fix the scratch he made: 1) If the average person would pay to have the car fixed and for personal reasons, you decided not to fix it the first time. If so, you can now decide to fix it, but you can only charge for the added price of the second scratch. 2) If the added damage from the second accident is that which causes the car to be in such a state that the average person would fix it despite the expense. If so, the second person would have to pay the whole price of fixing the scratch he made, not half. Again, we compare the situation before and after the accident in question and make the damager make up the difference. (Of course, you could not charge him for any added charge for fixing the first scratch.) Responsibly figuring out the car's depreciation and whether fixing it is warranted requires an experienced appraiser. Hiring one is probably expensive enough to make a compromise that all can live with the best option for two honest people. 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