Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Vayechi

Hemdat Yamim Parshat Vayechi 16 Tevet 5763 ============================== This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to the memory of R' Meir ben Yechezkel Shraga Brachfeld o.b.m. ============================== Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbis to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship combined with community service, ensures that its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations resulting in an exceptionally strong connection to Jewish communities worldwide. =============================== His Spirit Lives On / Harav Moshe Ehrenreich It certainly seems like Ya'akov died. In the opening of our parasha, it says, "And the days of Yisrael neared death" (Bereishit 47:29). Later, the Torah says: "Yisrael said to Yosef, 'behold I am dying' " (ibid. 48:21). We even have sources after the fact such as: "The doctors embalmed Yisrael" (ibid. 50:2). However, the situation suddenly becomes confusing, when attempting to explain the pasuk: "Ya'ak?v completed instructing his sons, and he gathered his legs to the bed, and he expired and was gathered to his nation (vayigva vayeiasef el amuv- a phrase that usually refers to death)" (ibid. 49:33). Rashi points out that the pasuk doesn't mention death, and Chazal say that Ya'akov did not die. The Ramban explains Chazal's statement, saying that "the souls of tzaddikim are bound up in the bond of life." The source in Chazal is the gemara in Ta'anit 5b: "R. Yochanan said: 'Ya'akov Avinu did not die.' They asked him: 'Was it for nothing that they eulogized him, embalmed him, and buried him?' He responded: 'I learn a pasuk, which says: 'Fear not my servant Ya'akov, said Hashem, and do not fear, Yisrael, for behold I will save you from your distant place and your offspring from the land of their captivity' (Yirmiya 30:10). Just as his offspring is living, so too, he is living.'" The Maharsha (ad loc.) points out that the lack of death refers to spiritual death. The gemara had to stress this specifically in reference to Ya'akov since he died outside of Eretz Yisrael, which is known as "the land of the living." Therefore one could mistakenly think that Ya'akov had died spiritually, so the gemara proves that he too did not die spiritually, because it is as if he died in Eretz Yisrael. We still need to explain the meaning here of life and death and why certain p'sukim do use the term death in reference to Ya'akov. Rav Charlop (Mei Marom VIII, 107) picks up on the fact that every time the Torah mentions death in regard to Ya'akov, it refers to him as "Yisrael." The pasuk of "vayigva vayeiasef el amuv," on the other hand, calls him Ya'akov. This teaches us that Ya'akov's death was only in regard to the element of Yisrael within his persona. What is the difference between the Ya'akov and Yisrael elements within our patriarch? Ya'akov was the name he was created with, representing his holy nature. Yisrael reflects the self-elevation he reached, as the pasuk explains the name, "for you stood up to angels and to men and were successful" (Bereishit 32:29). Something that is natural from the beginning of its creation remains unchanged. Therefore, the element of Ya'akov did not die but remained unchanged. The element of Yisrael which he reached through his power to choose self-elevation was not part of his nature and, therefore, was susceptible to change and death. Another explanation of Chazal's contention that Ya'akov did not die can be learned from study of our haftara. The navi tells of the last meeting of King David with his son, Shlomo, before David's death. We would expect that at such a meeting between these giants of the spiritual world, great secrets would be passed on. Indeed, Ya'akov had tried, under similar circumstances, to reveal the secret of the End of Days. When the Divine Presence left him, he sufficed with a special beracha for each of his sons, including a reference to the special goal and history of each. In contrast, David gives Shlomo general advice. "I am going (holeich) in the way of all the land, and you should strengthen yourself and turn into a man and be careful in the observances of Hashem, your G-d, to walk in His path" (Melachim I, 2:2-3). This seems to be the type of simple, final words of parting that any good Jew would give to his son. However, more careful study can uncover that David Hamelech left Shlomo with a very profound lesson. A deceased person is considered an omed, one who remains in his place. This is because he no longer has mitzvot that enable him to progress. David taught that, with the help of the actions of one's sons, one can still move forward (holeich) after death. This is because the good actions of the son, which stem from the education that the father gave him, cause continuing spiritual progress for the parent. This is also what is meant by the term, "a son is the leg of his father." In other words, the son is the vehicle for the father's movement. Returning to Ya'akov, we can understand as follows. Ya'akov was the father of the 12 tribes of Hashem, who formed together the level of holiness embodied in the name of Ya'akov. They enabled Ya'akov to be considered alive. As the aforementioned gemara said, just as his sons are alive (and doing mitzvot) so too (namely, because of them), he is still alive. ====================================== Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l) Organ Donations- Part II - Donation by the Living (II) (from Chavot Binyamin, siman 109) [We saw that the obligation to save a life is both a positive and negative commandment, and, as the Radvaz understands the gemara, includes readiness to enter a certain level of danger.] The Radvaz based his determination that one should enter danger of up to 50% on the Yerushalmi. The Yerushalmi is brought by the Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 426) as follows: "In the Yerushalmi it is decided that one is required even to place himself in a doubt of danger. And the reason appears to be that the other person is [in] certain danger and he is [only in] possible danger, and whoever sustains a life in Israel is as if he sustained an entire world." According to the Radvaz it is not referring to only a distant danger. (See Minchat Chinuch 237 who wondered about the halacha of the Yerushalmi and points out that it was omitted by the Shulchan Aruch). In comparing the two responsa of the Radvaz we have some difficulty. The first one requires saving only where there isn't danger (as it stresses that when the matter involves danger, the one who saves is but a "crazy righteous man"). Why, in the second case, of someone drowning in the river and the like does he determine that if he does not save [because of the danger] he violates "lo ta'amod al dam reiecha" (do not stand aside as your brother's blood is spilled), whereas in the first case he categorized his willingness for self-sacrifice as an attribute of righteousness, without an obligation? The explanation is based on what we stressed, that the obligation to save one's friend is within the framework of returning lost objects. Even though it is broader than the obligation to return property, it too is limited to the obligation to toil. The toil requires even exertion, but the obligation does not reach the point of damaging his life, even a single limb in a case that does not involve danger. The reason is that bearing suffering and physical pain is not included in the obligation which the Torah places on a person to help his fellow. Therefore, the requirement is only of an act of righteousness, which is a higher level [and lower obligation] than matters of "beyond the letter of the law." ("Beyond the letter of the law" is at least something that can be demanded and [if one refrains from doing it] is close to the attribute of Sodomites). Igrot Moshe (YD II, 174) agrees with this approach. What if that which is needed is a donation of blood or the like, which are things that the body replaces? If we follow the rule that we see from the gemara's examples, which are within the boundaries of toil, it seems that this too is not included in the mitzva to "return his body." However, it is proper to include it within the category of "beyond the letter of the law," since a person doesn't really lose anything by doing it, and it causes him unpleasantness only for a short time. ===================================== Ask the Rabbi Question: Is it permitted to cut cake which has writing or decoration on it on Shabbat? Answer: The Rama (OC 340:3) rules that "one is forbidden to break a cake that has written on it letter-like forms, even though he intends only to eat, because this is erasing." The Dagul Meir'vava (ad loc.) assumes that, according to the Rama, the same is true of picture-like forms. The prohibition also applies if small items (sprinkles, nuts, etc.) are arranged so that they create such figures (Shmirat Shabbat K'hilchata 11:7). (Little puffs of icing aren't considered a picture, but carefully made "flowers" may be). That is the stringent part of the picture. The Dagul Meir'vava asks on the Rama from the gemara (Pesachim 37a) that other than for problems of chametz, one can eat s'rikin on seder night. S'rikin are matzot made in the shape of specific animals (Magid Mishneh, Chametz U'matza 5:15) and, therefore, should be forbidden, according to the Rama, as erasing. A distinction which is accepted by most poskim (see Mishna Berura 340:15) is between a case where the writing is a separate substance on top of the cake, which is forbidden, and between where the cake is formed in or with the shape of letters or pictures. In the latter case, it is not considered erasing writing and is permitted. Even in the case of a separate layer, there are certain grounds for leniency. The Torah-level prohibition of erasing applies only when done in order to write on the erased area (as opposed to our case of cutting in order to eat). Additionally, in our case, one does not intend specifically to cut the letters, but to cut the cake. When one does something which will clearly cause a violation but without specific intent (p'sik reishei), some permit the action if the violation is only rabbinic (Trumat Hadeshen 64), as in our case. Even though we are normally strict, one might permit the action if there is additional leniency. Therefore, we permit the "erasure" if it is done by mouth during eating, not by knife or fork, as this is an unusual way to break letters (Mishna Berura 340:17). The Dagul Meir'vava permitted even cutting with a knife, as it is destructive and an unusual erasure done without specific intention. Although most poskim do not agree, the great weight of his rulings should preclude criticizing those who are lenient. A couple of practical suggestions are in order. According to most authorities, one can cut in between letters, while breaking up words (see Shmirat Shabbat K'hilchata 9:(48)). Even if one cuts in such a way that there is a reasonable chance the letters won't be broken, it is permissible even if some are inadvertently cut. One can also slice off the lettering before cutting. The easiest way to do that is to put the design on top of a small cookie sheet discreetly stuck to the top of the cake. Hemdat Yamim is published weekly in conjunction with Gemara Berura. Harav Shaul Israeli zt"l Founder and President Deans: Harav Yosef Carmel Harav Moshe Ehrenreich ERETZ HEMDAH 5 Ha-Mem Gimmel St. P.O.B 36236 Jerusalem 91360 Tel/Fax: 972-2-5371485 Email: eretzhem@netvision.net.il web-site: www.eretzhemdah.org American Friends of Eretz Hemdah Institutions c/o Olympian 8 South Michigan Ave. Suite 605 Chicago, IL 60603 USA Our Taxpayer ID#: 36-4265359

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