Parashat Shavua

Hemdat Yamim Parashat Vayegash 5764

Hemdat Yamim Parshat Vayigash 9 Tevet 5764 ******************************************** This edition of Hemdat Yamim is dedicated to the memory of R' Meir ben Yechezkel Shraga Brachfeld o.b.m. and Yitzchak Eliezer Ben Avraham Mordechai Jacobson o.b.m *************************************************************************************** Eretz Hemdah is the premier institution for training young rabbis to take the Israeli Rabbinate's rigorous Yadin Yadin examinations. Eretz Hemdah, with its distinctive blend of Religious Zionist philosophy and scholarship combined with community service, ensures that its graduates emerge with the finest training, the noblest motivations resulting in an exceptionally strong connection to Jewish communities worldwide. ************************************************************************************************************************** Seeing with One's Eyes Closed Harav Yosef Carmel Before Yaakov's descent to Egypt, Hashem reassured him: "Do not fear ... there I will make you into a great nation. I will go down with you to Egypt and I will surely bring you up, and Yosef will place his hand on your eyes" (Bereishit 46:2-4). Many commentaries struggle with the ambiguous phrase, "Yosef will place his hand on your eyes." The Rashbam explains that Hashem was reassuring Yaakov that Yosef would see to his needs while in Egypt. The Ibn Ezra, however, sees this as a guarantee to Yaakov that he would not be separated from Yosef until he died. Yosef would be by Yaakov's deathbed, placing his hand on Yaakov's eyes, according to the custom they followed. Support for the Ibn Ezra's interpretation is found in Midrash Sechel Tov. When Yaakov died, Yosef fell on his father's face (ibid 50:1). Why is this said only about Yosef? Did his brothers act differently? Rather, it specifically mentions Yosef's falling, to tell us of the fulfillment of Hashem's promise to Yaakov, 'and Yosef will place his hand on your eyes.' According to the Ibn Ezra's explanation, the placing of Yosef's hand is related to Hashem's promise, "I will surely bring you up [to Eretz Yisrael]," which also was fulfilled only upon Yaakov's death. However, according to both the Ibn Ezra and Rashbam, the pasuk seems chronologically out of order. The phrase, "and Yosef will place his hand on your eyes," which was fulfilled during his lifetime or as he died, should appear in the middle of the pasuk. Why is found at the end of the pasuk, after the matter of Yaakov's posthumous return to the Land? The Meshech Chuchma offers a unique interpretation, which, among other things, solves the problem of this phrase's positioning. He explains that Hashem was telling Yaakov not to overly analyze why he was descending to Egypt. With our limited understanding, we cannot comprehend why Hashem does certain things. Who could have guessed that the pain Yosef endured during his sale and imprisonment would eventually lead to his position as viceroy to the king of Egypt, a position that enabled him to promulgate his righteous ideologies? In other words, the story of Yosef should teach Yaakov to "close his eyes" in the face of Divine Providence. Indeed, Yosef's arrival in Egypt, and later that of the rest of his family, was part of a bigger master plan that could be understood only when all of its stages would come to fruition. These events made it possible to attempt to bring Hashem's kingship to the most influential society of its time. Yosef, as viceroy to Pharaoh, tried to make a monotheistic revolution in a land of idolatry. Had all been aware of this from the beginning, those involved would not have been so skeptical and could have appreciated the importance of the difficult events that transpired. This approach fits very nicely with the p'sukim in Tehillim, which describe the events of Yosef's life. "As a slave Yosef was sold ... an iron chain was laid on his soul. Until the time His word came to pass, the words of Hashem purified him. The king sent (for him) and they freed him ... He was appointed as master of his house and ruler of all his possessions. To imprison his officers as he desired and make his elders wise" (Tehillim 105: 17-22). *************************************************************************************************************************** P'ninat Mishpat- Binding Nature of Informing Landlords of Intention to End Rental (from Piskei Din of the Rabbinical Courts of Yerushalayim, vol. I, pp. 39-43) Case: A rental agreement was signed, under whose conditions the renters could decide to leave before the end of the lease with three months notice. The renters indeed gave notice that they intended to leave but subsequently decided to continue with the rental. However, when they informed the landlord of their intention to stay, the landlord said he would allow them to stay only if the rent was significantly increased. Ruling: The gemara (Bava Metzia 67b) discusses a borrower who gave over his field to his lender as collateral in a place where the practice was that the lender cannot be removed until the end of the period of the loan. The gemara concludes that in a case that the lender agreed that he could be removed at any time, the agreement is binding only if a kinyan (formal act of acquisition) was done. The Rishonim dispute whether a kinyan is necessary only if the dispensation was made after the loan was made or even if it was decided before the loan was made and the collateral was given over. The Rivash (Shut 510) was asked about a case, similar to ours, where the renter informed the landlord of his intention to leave the land but later backed out before they acted on that decision and without a kinyan having been made. The Rivash felt that the aforementioned gemara is a precedent that in order to prematurely end a temporary right of one person on another person's field, a kinyan is necessary to return the land to the possession of its original owner. Until that kinyan is done, all agreements to the contrary are void. On the other hand, the Machane Ephrayim (Sechirut 9) argues with the Rivash and says that since the field is the property of the landlord, he does need to reacquire it. He deflects the proof from Bava Metzia by saying that there the agreement to allow the borrower to receive his collateral back was premature, as it was done before the borrower was ready to return the loan and reclaim his field. In general, when one gives temporary control over his field to another for a set amount of time, as in a normal rental, he does not need a kinyan to get it back. In a case where there is an explicit stipulation in the contract that the rental can be terminated before the appointed date, there are two times that the rental ceases naturally, without the need for a kinyan. One is at the set date, and the other is at any date determined later according to the conditions set out. Thus, when the renters terminate the rental early, there should be no need for a kinyan. However, in our case, the renters' announcement of their intention to end the rental is not binding without a kinyan, because it was intended to announce a future end to the rental and not to take effect immediately. We saw that even the Machane Ephrayim, who usually did not require a kinyan, required one when the end of the field's control by someone other than the owner had not yet taken effect. Thus, the renters can back out until the rental finishes. *************************************************************************************************************************** Moreshet Shaul (from the works of Hagaon Harav Shaul Yisraeli zt"l) Doctors' Wages (from Chavot Binyamin, siman 110) Although classically, it is forbidden for people to take money in order to heal others (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 336:2), there is room to say that these days the situation is somewhat different, as we will explain. The gemara (Kiddushin 58b) says that although one may not take money to sprinkle or sanctify the special water of the para aduma, as one may not demand money to perform mitzvot, he may take money to "bring and fill the water." The Machane Ephrayim (Sechirut 17) explains that the sanctifying and sprinkling is a mitzva, while the bringing and filling is not. This distinction can explain the Ramban's statement (in Torat Ha'adam, Inyan Hasakana) regarding the wages of a doctor. He rules that a doctor may not take money for the wisdom and learning required to heal, but he can take money for the toil, because it is analogous to the fees for "bringing and filling." This is because of the difficulty and expense of going through the training to become a doctor, which is not an obligatory mitzva on any given person, as no one is specifically obligated to choose the field of medicine as his profession. The aforementioned can also explain the distinction between money taken by a doctor and that demanded by a ferry operator who charged an exaggerated fee from one who was fleeing from prison (see Bava Kama 116a). In the latter case, the fugitive is not required to pay the price he promised. The Ramban says that the doctor is different, because the obligation is not upon him specifically, as opposed to the ferry operator. It is not clear what case the Ramban is referring to. After all, if a doctor is specifically approached, and especially in a case where he is the only one in the vicinity who is capable of offering the necessary help, why shouldn't he too be required to save the life for free? Rather, the Ramban means that the obligation was not specifically on him to study how to heal others, and he may take money from the beneficiaries of his expertise for making the effort to receive training. Since it is difficult to estimate how much that price should be, any price that the sick person agrees to is binding. In the case of the ferry operator, as well, if there were other available ferries, and the fugitive promised one operator a high price, he has to pay, because he was not forced to use this ferry operator. However, if all the ferries charged an unreasonable price, then he would be exempt from paying the high price. Similarly, if all of the doctors were to charge an unreasonable price, one would be exempt from paying it. However, since the Ramban says, "there is no price for his wisdom," one cannot refuse to pay after previously agreeing. Let it be clear, though, that if the doctor charges more than he deserves [for the toil, expense, and lost opportunity of another profession] he transgresses his obligation to provide the service for free. Likewise, when he charges a price, he chooses to forgo the opportunity to do the mitzva of saving someone for its own sake into a business opportunity to compensate for the toil of his training. [Ed. note- Rav Yisraeli probably meant that there is an element of the mitzva that is lost, but the positive nature of the occupation still exists.] However, he is permitted to take money because of the training. The aforementioned approach seems to be nearly explicit in the Taz (YD 336:3). The Taz also combines the factor that originally the doctor was not responsible to learn medicine with the fact that he made a condition that he would take money. If he is taking money for his work in the present, what difference does it make that, some time in the past, he was exempt from studying medicine? It must be, then, that the money that he takes is for those preparations. [Ed. note- the simple language of the Taz sounds like there is a prohibition to demand the money, but that the person who promised it is required to pay, from his perspective.] *************************************************************************************************************************** Ask the Rabbi Question: If one has a cracked lip, does he have to be concerned about swallowing blood? Answer: The prohibition against ingesting blood is a very severe one (see Vayikra 17: 10-14). However, the full force of the prohibition does not apply to human blood (Ketubot 60a). In fact, according to most opinions, ingesting human blood is only forbidden mid'rabanan (rabbinically) (see Rambam, Ma'achalot Asurot 6:2). Furthermore, the rabbinic prohibition does not apply across the board to turn human blood into an objective rabbinic prohibition. Rather, the prohibition depends on the circumstances, one of which we will discuss. The gemara (ibid.) starts by discussing whether it is permitted for people to drink mother's milk and brings an apparent contradiction on the matter. The gemara concludes that it is permitted to drink human milk once it has been removed from the body, but not directly from a mother, which is permitted only for babies. It then points out that the opposite is true by human blood, as illustrated by a baraita. The baraita says that one can swallow the blood that may be found in between one's teeth, but not if it has found its way onto a piece of bread he is eating. Rashi explains that once it is on the bread, one might think that he is eating animal blood that got on the bread. Following this approach, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 66:10) calls it a prohibition of marit ayin (when that which people think they are seeing is forbidden), in this case, that he is ingesting animal blood. The question then becomes which situations are included in the marit ayin prohibition. Tosafot (K'ritot 21b) says that one may lick the blood which drips out of a wound on his finger (this is by no means a medical suggestion), because it is clear from the fact that the blood is taken directly from the body that it is human blood. However, the Minchat Yaakov, in his commentary on the Torat Chatat (62:25), infers from Rashi in Ketubot (ibid.) that he disagrees. Rashi says that the reason that it is permitted to swallow the blood from between the teeth is that "there is none that sees it." The Minchat Yaakov reasons that according to this approach, it is forbidden to suck the blood from the wound on a finger, because it can be readily seen. The Darkei Teshuva (66:68) cites additional opinions on either side. What about our case, regarding blood coming from cracked lips? According to Tosafot, it is clearly not a problem for him to swallow the blood. What about according to Rashi? One could claim that if the blood is visible, then it is a problem. But it is more likely that Rashi, when saying, "there is none that sees it," was referring not to the blood but to the ingestion of the blood. While one can notice a person licking the blood off his finger, one cannot notice how, as the top lip meets the bottom lip, some blood may enter the mouth. One can make the same calculation with regard to the use of dental floss. (I know there are people who would love nothing more than a halachic excuse not to use it, but they will have to go elsewhere to find one). It is true that the floss sometimes picks up some blood, which is noticeable and that it is not always cleaned before being put back into the mouth, where some may be ingested. However, it is not clear to one who sees the flossing that any of that blood will be ingested, nor will the ingestion be visible. Therefore, it is likely that even Rashi would agree that it is not necessary to clean the bloodstained dental floss before reinserting it into the mouth. In any case, the Kaf Hachayim (YD 66:47) says that there are more who agree with Tosafot than with Rashi and one can rely on the lenient opinions in this rabbinic matter. 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